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Abstract	  Today	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  includes	  multiple	  bi-­‐lateral	  initiatives	  in	  the	  military,	  industrial,	  and	  private	  sectors.	  Israel	  is	  Americas	  most	  established	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  to	  possess	  a	  “special	  relationship”	  highly	  valued	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Although	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  drive	  both	  American	  and	  Israeli	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  today,	  following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  the	  United	  States	  originally	  did	  not	  advance	  major	  aid	  and	  benefits	  to	  the	  new	  state.	  While	  current	  foreign	  policy	  focuses	  on	  preserving	  the	  strong	  relationship	  with	  the	  only	  democratic	  nation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Israel,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  the	  United	  States	  global	  foreign	  policy	  focused	  on	  combating	  Soviet	  Influence	  and	  containing	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  The	  early	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  was	  contrived	  around	  United	  States	  Cold	  War	  strategies	  that	  dominated	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  for	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  Century.	  All	  the	  presidents	  ranging	  from	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  to	  Harry	  Truman	  all	  supported	  the	  proposition	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  not	  engineered	  by	  domestic	  lobbies	  or	  the	  American	  Jewish	  population,	  but	  emerged	  as	  a	  strategic	  relationship	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  originally	  predicated	  upon	  early	  commitments	  the	  United	  States	  upheld	  including	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  of	  1917	  and	  United	  Nations	  Resolution	  181	  (1947)	  which	  both	  dictated	  a	  form	  of	  a	  Jewish	  home	  in	  the	  area	  known	  as	  Palestine.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  American	  credibility,	  and	  out	  maneuver	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  became	  the	  first	  nation	  to	  extend	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  on	  May	  14,	  1949.	  The	  United	  States	  policy	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  Israel’s	  existence	  was	  reflexive	  of	  greater	  global	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  focused	  on	  combating	  Communist	  expansion.	  In	  its	  early	  years,	  Israel	  originally	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐alignment	  with	  both	  the	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  Powers	  in	  order	  for	  the	  state	  to	  receive	  opportunities	  available	  from	  both	  blocks.	  The	  United	  States	  took	  a	  hesitant	  approach	  towards	  Israel	  and	  focused	  on	  building	  relationships	  with	  the	  Arab	  states	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  American	  Cold	  War	  policy	  dictated	  American	  policy	  towards	  Israel.	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  American	  affiliation	  with	  Israel	  derive	  from	  Israel’s	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐communism	  following	  Arab	  alignment	  and	  arms	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  block	  in	  the	  1950’s.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  balance	  of	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  the	  United	  States	  shifted	  its	  attitude	  towards	  Israel	  and	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  the	  two	  countries	  relationship.	  The	  sale	  of	  Hawk	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles	  marked	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship	  and	  led	  to	  the	  bi-­‐national	  military	  collaborations	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  for	  today.	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Introduction	  	  	   Today	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  includes	  multiple	  bi-­‐lateral	  initiatives	  in	  the	  military,	  industrial,	  and	  private	  sectors.	  Israel	  is	  Americas	  most	  established	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  to	  possess	  a	  “special	  relationship”	  highly	  valued	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Although	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  drive	  both	  American	  and	  Israeli	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  today,	  following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  the	  United	  States	  originally	  did	  not	  advance	  major	  aid	  and	  benefits	  to	  the	  new	  state.	  America	  did	  not	  always	  consider	  Israel	  the	  United	  State’s	  closest	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  While	  current	  foreign	  policy	  focuses	  on	  preserving	  the	  strong	  relationship	  with	  the	  only	  democratic	  nation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  the	  United	  States	  global	  foreign	  policy	  focused	  on	  combating	  Soviet	  Influence	  and	  containing	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  	   All	  the	  presidents	  ranging	  from	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  to	  Harry	  Truman	  all	  supported	  the	  proposition	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  not	  engineered	  by	  domestic	  lobbies	  or	  the	  American	  Jewish	  population,	  but	  emerged	  as	  a	  strategic	  relationship	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  originally	  predicated	  upon	  early	  commitments	  the	  United	  States	  upheld	  including	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  of	  1917	  and	  United	  Nations	  Resolution	  181	  (1947)	  which	  both	  dictated	  a	  form	  of	  a	  Jewish	  home	  in	  the	  area	  known	  as	  Palestine.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  American	  credibility,	  and	  out	  maneuver	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  became	  the	  first	  nation	  to	  extend	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  on	  May	  14,	  1949.	  	  Following	  the	  creation	  of	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the	  State	  of	  Israel	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  advocated	  for	  policy	  options	  that	  gave	  preference	  to	  Arab	  nations	  over	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  dominant	  American	  presence	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Under	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Israel	  replicated	  recommendations	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  that	  aimed	  at	  keeping	  Soviet	  Influence	  at	  bay	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  by	  maintaining	  a	  positive	  rapport	  with	  Arab	  nations.	  	   The	  State	  Department	  strategy	  included	  awarding	  Arab	  nations	  with	  generous	  American	  financial	  aid	  while	  criticizing	  Israeli	  policy	  and	  withholding	  arms	  and	  financial	  assistance.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1950’s	  State	  Department	  policy	  failed	  to	  deter	  the	  Arab	  states,	  most	  notably	  Egypt,	  from	  maintaining	  relationships	  with	  the	  Soviet	  bloc	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  shift	  in	  America’s	  preference	  towards	  Israel.	  American	  policy	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  continued	  to	  reflect	  came	  as	  a	  result	  what	  would	  	  Many	  people	  are	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  and	  the	  Pro-­‐Israel	  lobby	  forced	  U.S.	  support	  for	  Israel,	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  Israel’s	  existence	  the	  support	  of	  the	  state	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  would	  serve	  greater	  U.S.	  national	  interests.	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Chapter	  1:	  United	  States	  and	  Palestine	  	  	   Before	  the	  Jewish	  State	  was	  established	  in	  May	  1948	  there	  had	  already	  been	  over	  six	  decades	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel.	  Under	  the	  presidency	  of	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson,	  the	  United	  States	  supported	  the	  British	  Balfour	  Declaration.	  Lord	  Balfour	  wrote	  this	  declaration	  in	  1917	  in	  an	  open	  letter	  to	  Lord	  Rothschild,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  British	  Zionist	  Federation.	  The	  declaration	  endorsed	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  Palestine,	  affirming	  that	  the	  British	  Government	  would	  ensure	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Jewish	  national	  home.1	  Lord	  Balfour	  wrote	  in	  his	  correspondence	  to	  Lord	  Rothschild	  that:	  	   His	  Majesty's	  government	  view	  with	  favour	  the	  establishment	  in	  Palestine	  of	  a	  national	  home	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  and	  will	  use	  their	  best	  endeavours	  to	  facilitate	  the	  achievement	  of	  this	  object,	  it	  being	  clearly	  understood	  that	  nothing	  shall	  be	  done	  which	  may	  prejudice	  the	  civil	  and	  religious	  rights	  of	  existing	  non-­‐Jewish	  communities	  in	  Palestine,	  or	  the	  rights	  and	  political	  status	  enjoyed	  by	  Jews	  in	  any	  other	  country.2	  	  The	  statement	  was	  later	  officially	  incorporated	  in	  the	  British	  Mandate	  for	  Palestine,	  thus	  becoming	  an	  official	  part	  of	  British	  policy.	  Although	  President	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  was	  initially	  hesitant	  to	  publically	  affirm	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Zionist	  cause,	  for	  fear	  of	  losing	  “Arab	  good	  will	  and	  access	  to	  Middle	  Eastern	  oil”3	  he	  decided	  that	  his	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Robert	  John,	  "Behind	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration:	  Britain's	  Great	  War	  Pledge	  to	  Lord	  Rothschild,"	  The	  Journal	  of	  Historical	  Review	  6,	  no.	  4	  (Winter	  1985-­‐1986,	  1985)395.	  2	  Lord	  Arthur	  James	  Balfour,	  Balfour	  Declaration,	  12/2/1917.	  3	  Henry	  D.	  Fetter,	  "'Showdown	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office':	  12	  may	  1948	  in	  History,"	  Israel	  
Affairs	  14,	  no.	  3	  (July	  2008,	  2008)1.	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endorsement	  of	  the	  Zionist	  cause	  would	  not	  hinder	  political	  developments	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.4	  	   In	  July	  1922,	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  gave	  control	  over	  the	  Palestinian	  territory	  to	  the	  British.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  the	  British	  Mandate.	  On	  June	  30,	  1922	  the	  United	  States	  Congress	  passed	  a	  resolution,	  “favouring	  the	  establishment	  in	  Palestine	  of	  a	  national	  home	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people.”5	  	  In	  April	  1922	  the	  House	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee	  stated,	  in	  a	  hearing,	  that:	  	   The	  Jews	  of	  America	  are	  profoundly	  interested	  in	  establishing	  a	  National	  Home	  in	  the	  ancient	  land	  for	  their	  race.	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  ideal	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people,	  everywhere,	  for,	  despite	  their	  dispersion,	  Palestine	  has	  been	  the	  object	  of	  their	  veneration	  since	  they	  were	  expelled	  by	  the	  Romans.	  For	  generations	  they	  have	  prayed	  for	  the	  return	  to	  Zion.	  During	  the	  past	  century	  this	  prayer	  has	  assumed	  practical	  form.6	  	  President	  Wilson	  established	  a	  precedent	  for	  the	  U.S.	  Presidency	  to	  support	  the	  proposed	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  Palestine.	  His	  successors	  including	  President	  Warren	  Harding	  and	  President	  Calvin	  Coolidge	  both	  supported	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration.7	  On	  September	  21,	  1922,	  the	  incumbent	  President	  Warren	  G.	  Harding	  signed	  a	  joint	  resolution,	  approving	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home	  in	  Palestine.8	  President	  Herbert	  Hoover	  also	  supported	  the	  proposed	  Jewish	  National	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  John,	  Behind	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration:	  Britain's	  Great	  War	  Pledge	  to	  Lord	  Rothschild,	  389-­‐450	  	  5	  Ibid.	  6	  House	  Committee	  on	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  Establishment	  of	  a	  National	  Home	  in	  Palestine,	  2nd	  sess.,	  1922,	  1-­‐174.	  7	  Dennis	  Brian,	  The	  Elected	  and	  the	  Chosen:	  Why	  American	  Presidents	  have	  Supported	  
Jews	  and	  Israel	  :	  From	  George	  Washington	  to	  Barack	  Obama,	  2012th	  ed.	  (Jerusalem:	  Gefen	  Publishing	  House,	  2012)192.	  8	  Jonathan	  J.	  Pierce,	  "Coalition	  Stability	  and	  Belief	  Change:	  Advocacy	  Coalitions	  in	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel,	  1922?44,"	  Policy	  Studies	  Journal	  39,	  no.	  3	  (2011)	  416.	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home	  in	  Palestine.	  In	  a	  letter	  written	  in	  1932	  to	  Emanuel	  Neumann,	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  of	  America,	  President	  Hoover	  wrote	  that	  he	  was	  “in	  favor	  of	  the	  age-­‐old	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Jewish	  people	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  their	  national	  homeland.”9	  	   Franklin	  Delano	  Roosevelt	  openly	  expressed	  support	  for	  a	  Jewish	  National	  home,	  but	  was	  later	  criticized	  for	  secret	  assurances	  he	  made	  the	  King	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  Ibn	  Saud.	  President	  Roosevelt	  condemned	  the	  British	  White	  Paper,	  which	  weakened	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home.10	  In	  the	  years	  following,	  Ibn	  Saud	  became	  skeptical	  of	  the	  American’s	  position	  toward	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home,	  leading	  President	  Roosevelt	  to	  covertly	  change	  his	  attitude	  about	  the	  Jews	  in	  Palestine.11	  While	  Roosevelt	  confided	  in	  Saud	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  honor	  the	  interest	  of	  its	  Arab	  friends,	  publically	  he	  assured	  the	  Jews	  that	  he	  would	  aid	  them	  in	  creating	  a	  home	  for	  them	  in	  Palestine.12	  	  	  	   President	  Harry	  Truman	  also	  expressed	  his	  support	  for	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  before	  he	  became	  president.	  Truman	  was	  initially	  introduced	  to	  the	  question	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  while	  serving	  as	  a	  Senator	  of	  Missouri	  from	  1935	  to	  1945.13	  As	  a	  Senator	  he	  expressed	  his	  support	  of	  House	  Resolution	  360	  from	  1922.	  This	  resolution	  supported	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  home.	  Furthermore,	  this	  endorsement	  came	  in	  light	  of	  Truman’s	  critique	  of	  the	  1939	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Brian,	  The	  Elected	  and	  the	  Chosen:	  Why	  American	  Presidents	  have	  Supported	  Jews	  
and	  Israel	  :	  From	  George	  Washington	  to	  Barack	  Obama201	  10	  Peter	  Grose,	  Israel	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  America,	  1983rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Alfred	  A.	  Knopf,	  Inc.,	  1983)138.	  11	  Ibid.	  143.	  12	  Ibid.	  146.	  13	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel,	  39,	  directed	  by	  John	  Snetsinger	  (Stanford,	  Calif.:	  Hoover	  Institution	  Press,	  1974)	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British	  White	  Paper	  on	  Palestine,	  a	  paper	  that	  essentially	  opposed	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  home.1415	  On	  May	  25,	  1939	  Truman,	  inserted	  an	  article	  in	  the	  Congressional	  Record	  critiquing	  the	  White	  Paper	  and	  criticizing	  Britain’s	  repudiation	  of	  its	  obligation	  to	  satisfy	  the	  proposals	  set	  out	  in	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration.16	  Although	  Truman	  initially	  supported	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  home,	  he	  changed	  his	  attitude	  towards	  a	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  strong	  relationship	  with	  Arab	  nations.17	  For	  Truman	  the	  question	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  depended	  on	  how	  it	  affected	  U.S.	  interest.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Ibid.	  17.	  15	  Itamar	  Rabinovich	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz,	  eds.,	  Israel	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Documents	  
and	  Readings	  on	  Society,	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Pre-­‐1949	  to	  the	  Present,	  Vol.	  1st	  (Hanover:	  University	  Press	  of	  New	  England,	  2008),	  626.	  	  The	  British	  White	  Paper	  did	  not	  explicitly	  prohibit	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home,	  but	  implicitly	  did	  so	  by	  restricting	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  the	  Palestine.	  Under	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  White	  Paper	  the	  plans	  for	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  were	  impossible	  because	  there	  was	  no	  way	  under	  the	  quotas	  that	  enough	  Jews	  could	  immigrate	  to	  Palestine	  to	  sustain	  a	  stable	  population	  16	  Joseph	  Michael	  Cohen,	  Truman	  and	  Israel,	  1st	  ed.	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1990)44-­‐45.	  17	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel17	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Relationship	  Following	  World	  War	  II	  	   World	  War	  II	  introduced	  a	  complication	  to	  the	  question	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  Following	  the	  defeat	  of	  Germany	  in	  May	  1945,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  Jews	  who	  survived	  the	  Holocaust	  in	  Europe	  became	  refugees.	  The	  original	  but	  temporary	  solution	  was	  to	  place	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Displaced	  Person’s	  camps	  throughout	  Austria,	  Italy,	  and	  Germany.18	  In	  the	  months	  following,	  Truman	  urged	  the	  British	  government	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  Jewish	  refugees,	  appealing	  to	  the	  assurances	  of	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration.	  	  	   Truman	  framed	  this	  recommendation	  as	  response	  to	  the	  testimony	  in	  the	  
Harrison	  Report.	  The	  Harrison	  Report	  was	  a	  report	  written	  by	  Earl	  G.	  Harrison,	  the	  Dean	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  Law	  School,	  former	  Commissioner	  of	  Immigration,	  and	  American	  envoy	  to	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Refugees.19	  In	  his	  letter	  to	  the	  President	  on	  August	  24,	  1945,	  Harrison,	  as	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  Intergovernmental	  Committee	  on	  Refugees,	  harshly	  criticized	  the	  treatment	  of	  Jewish	  refugees	  in	  Germany	  by	  Allied	  forces	  and	  U.S.	  Army	  soldiers.20	  In	  response	  to	  the	  Harrison	  Report,	  Truman	  wrote	  to	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Clement	  Attlee	  urging	  him	  to	  allow	  a	  reasonable	  number	  of	  Jews	  into	  Palestine	  under	  the	  British	  Mandate.21	  It	  was	  then,	  when	  Truman	  sympathized	  with	  the	  displaced	  Jews	  in	  Europe,	  that	  he	  made	  a	  motion	  in	  congress	  to	  support	  a	  Jewish	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  "Displaced	  Persons,"	  United	  States	  Holocaust	  Memorial	  Museum,	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=100054622013).	  19	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel17	  20	  Earl	  G.	  Harrison,	  Harrison	  Report	  (London,	  England:	  ,[1945]).	  21	  Michael	  J.	  Devine,	  Robert	  P.	  Watson	  and	  Robert	  J.	  Wolz,	  Israel	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  
Harry	  S.	  Truman	  (Kirksville,	  MO:	  Truman	  State	  University	  Press,	  2008)97.	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home	  in	  Palestine.	  The	  State	  Department	  held	  an	  opposing	  opinion,	  and	  recommended	  to	  the	  President	  not	  to	  support	  any	  policy	  involving	  Jewish	  immigration	  that	  could	  anger	  Arabs	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.22	  	   President	  Truman	  was	  met	  with	  two	  conflicting	  opinions	  within	  his	  own	  administration	  while	  considering	  the	  “Palestine	  Problem”.23	  The	  State	  Department	  led	  the	  group	  contesting	  U.S.	  policy	  that	  would	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  The	  State	  Department	  and	  its	  allies	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  reckless	  to	  risk	  American	  strategic	  and	  economic	  postwar	  interest	  with	  Arab	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State.	  President	  Truman’s	  personal	  staff	  and	  close	  aides	  persuaded	  the	  President	  that	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State	  was	  as	  a	  political	  necessity.24	  Truman	  factored	  both	  national	  interest	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  consistent	  official	  policy	  on	  the	  Jewish	  State	  when	  making	  considerations	  of	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Palestine.	  	  	   Truman	  base	  his	  policies	  in	  order	  to	  placate	  the	  American	  Zionist	  or	  win	  the	  Jewish	  vote	  in	  his	  upcoming	  election,	  but	  dealt	  with	  the	  question	  of	  Israel	  carefully	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  not	  interfering	  with	  other	  Middle	  Eastern	  Interest.25	  For	  example,	  in	  1945	  the	  American	  Zionists	  felt	  that	  Truman	  did	  not	  push	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Clement	  Attlee	  as	  much	  as	  he	  was	  capable	  of.26	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel17	  23	  Ibid..	  24	  Ibid.,11-­‐12.	  25	  Grose,	  Israel	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  America205.	  26	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel18,	  18.	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   Even	  though	  Arab	  leaders	  expressed	  dissatisfaction	  with	  Truman’s	  support	  of	  Jewish	  immigration,	  Truman	  did	  not	  isolate	  Arab	  leaders	  and	  remained	  consistent	  on	  his	  policies.27	  	  	   The	  State	  Department	  further	  criticized	  President	  Truman’s	  policy	  on	  the	  immigration	  of	  Jews	  following	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  November	  1945.	  The	  committee	  investigated	  Britain’s	  policy	  regarding	  Jewish	  immigration	  into	  Palestine	  in	  early	  1946.	  Following	  the	  committee’s	  investigation,	  the	  Taft-­‐Wagner	  Resolution	  was	  introduced	  into	  the	  U.S.	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  This	  resolution	  urged	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  commonwealth	  in	  Palestine.28	  	  Truman	  considered	  the	  opinions	  of	  American	  Zionists,	  but	  did	  not	  submit	  to	  their	  requests	  for	  American	  support	  for	  the	  Jews	  in	  Palestine.	  Truman	  waited	  for	  the	  official	  report	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  Committee	  of	  Inquiry	  in	  May	  1946	  before	  writing	  again	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Attlee	  expressing	  the	  expectation	  that	  Britain	  would	  revoke	  the	  barriers	  on	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  Palestine.29	  While	  Truman	  expressed	  his	  wish	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  immigrants	  in	  Palestine,	  he	  refrained	  from	  commenting	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  permanent	  solution	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  Jewish	  sovereign	  state.30	  	  After	  Truman	  made	  his	  support	  for	  the	  Committee	  Report	  public,	  the	  State	  Department	  conveyed	  their	  disapproval	  of	  the	  report	  to	  the	  President.	  In	  a	  Joint	  
Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Memorandum	  the	  State-­‐War-­‐Navy	  Coordinating	  Committee	  warned	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  19.	  28	  Cohen,	  Truman	  and	  Israel46-­‐47.	  29	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel27.	  30	  Michelle	  Mart,	  Eye	  on	  Israel	  :How	  America	  Came	  to	  View	  the	  Jewish	  State	  as	  an	  Ally	  (Albany:	  State	  University	  of	  New	  York	  Press,	  2006)34.	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President	  Truman	  of	  the	  cost	  of	  involving	  U.S.	  armed	  forces	  in	  the	  conflict	  in	  Palestine.31	  	  The	  motivation	  behind	  the	  State	  Department’s	  opposition	  to	  U.S.	  involvement	  was	  connected	  to	  the	  brewing	  conflict	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  the	  period	  between	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  Era,	  tensions	  increased	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.32	  The	  State	  Department	  felt	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  determined	  to	  increase	  its	  sphere	  of	  influence,	  might	  be	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  power	  in	  the	  region	  if	  the	  United	  States	  isolated	  itself	  through	  its	  Palestine	  Policy.	  There	  was	  a	  strong	  push	  from	  the	  State	  Department	  disengage	  from	  the	  Yishuv	  –	  the	  Jewish	  settlements	  in	  Palestine	  -­‐	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  United	  States	  from	  entering	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  maintain	  relations	  with	  the	  Arab	  countries.33	  The	  State	  Department,	  caught	  up	  in	  Cold	  War	  tensions,	  wanted	  to	  maintain	  positive	  relationships	  with	  Arab	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  Arab	  countries	  from	  building	  relations	  with	  communist	  Russia.34	  	  The	  State	  Department	  carried	  out	  a	  number	  of	  policies	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  shrink	  the	  communist	  sphere	  of	  influence	  and	  prevent	  Soviet	  authority	  from	  spreading.	  According	  to	  the	  State	  Department,	  if	  the	  United	  States	  supported	  a	  close	  affiliation	  with	  the	  Yishuv,	  then	  the	  Arab	  states	  would	  distance	  themselves	  with	  the	  democratic	  U.S.	  and	  look	  towards	  the	  communist	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  support.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  Washington,	  D.C.,	  "Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  to	  State-­‐War-­‐Navy	  Coordinating	  Committee"	  (Memorandum,	  President's	  Secretary's	  Files,	  Truman	  Papers,	  The	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  and	  Museum,	  Independence,	  MO,	  1946).	  32	  William	  B.	  Quandt,	  "America	  and	  the	  Middle	  East:	  A	  Fifty-­‐Year	  Overveiw,"	  in	  
Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  The	  International	  Relations	  of	  Regional	  and	  Outside	  
Powers,	  ed.	  Carl	  L.	  Brown	  (New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris	  Publishers,	  2001)59.	  33	  Fetter,	  'Showdown	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office':	  12	  may	  1948	  in	  History499	  34	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel83	  
	  	   13	  
	   Following	  World	  War	  II,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  emerged	  as	  a	  world	  power	  Consequently	  there	  was	  a	  power	  struggle	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  maintain	  influence	  over	  existing	  and	  developing	  states.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Cold	  War	  manifested	  itself	  through	  the	  Red	  Scare	  as	  well	  as	  a	  general	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiment.	  This	  sentiment	  reached	  its	  zenith	  in	  the	  1950’s.35	  	  Anti-­‐communist	  sentiment	  erupted	  following	  the	  U.S.	  use	  of	  the	  first	  Atomic	  Bomb	  on	  Hiroshima	  on	  August	  6,	  1945	  and	  the	  intensifying	  of	  the	  atomic	  race.	  Americans	  believed	  that	  there	  was	  an	  impending	  threat	  of	  atomic	  war	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  This	  belief	  ushered	  in	  an	  era	  of	  anxiety	  and	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  communist	  and	  their	  affiliates.	  Consequently	  U.S.	  officials	  and	  citizens	  turned	  against	  countries	  and	  people	  who	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  democracy	  and	  United	  States	  authority.36	  	   As	  the	  Cold	  War	  began	  Western	  leaders	  watched	  the	  Soviets	  establish	  regimes	  sympathetic	  to	  communism	  in	  Poland,	  the	  Baltic	  States,	  Romania,	  Hungary,	  and	  Bulgaria.	  During	  the	  winter	  of	  1946	  to	  1947	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  setting	  up	  a	  separate	  a	  regime	  in	  eastern	  Germany.37	  As	  countries	  continued	  to	  suffer	  economically	  while	  rebuilding	  infrastructure	  following	  World	  War	  II	  the	  Soviets	  supported	  communist	  parties	  and	  factions	  to	  establish	  greater	  Soviet	  influence.	  Communist	  parties	  in	  Italy	  and	  France	  were	  large,	  well	  supported,	  and	  acquired	  mass	  popularity.	  As	  the	  Soviets	  attempted	  to	  lay	  communist	  roots	  surrounding	  the	  western	  occupation	  zones	  in	  Germany,	  the	  U.S.	  began	  to	  fear	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  "Ideological	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Cold	  War."The	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library,	  http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/index.php2013).	  36	  Ibid.	  37	  Ibid.	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the	  entire	  continent	  was	  beginning	  to	  orient	  itself	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.38	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  disregarded	  the	  terms	  it	  agreed	  upon	  at	  the	  Yalta	  Conference	  and	  its	  assurance	  to	  allow	  free	  nations	  in	  Europe	  to	  hold	  free	  elections.	  Stalin	  reneged	  on	  guarantees	  concerning	  Eastern	  Europe	  following	  elections	  in	  Poland.39	  The	  United	  States	  wanted	  to	  diminish	  the	  power	  of	  the	  Soviets	  and	  prevent	  ceding	  the	  Middle	  East,	  like	  Eastern	  Europe,	  to	  the	  Soviets.	  40	  	   Beginning	  with	  the	  Truman	  administration	  the	  United	  States	  adopted	  policies	  protecting	  Cold	  War	  interest.	  The	  U.S.	  was	  apprehensive	  to	  begin	  a	  relationship	  with	  Israel	  because	  thought	  that	  it	  would	  not	  serve	  Cold	  War	  diplomacy.41	  The	  Truman	  administration	  made	  great	  attempts	  to	  contain	  Soviet	  influence	  and	  spread	  democratic	  values	  through	  foreign	  policy.	  Numerous	  State	  Department	  officials	  expressed	  concern	  for	  the	  growing	  communist	  threat.42	  George	  Kennan,	  a	  career	  State	  Department	  official	  stationed	  in	  Moscow,	  strongly	  supported	  containment.	  He	  conveyed	  what	  he	  recommended	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  in	  “The	  Sources	  of	  Soviet	  Conduct,”	  in	  July	  1947.	  He	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  implement	  a	  policy	  of	  caution	  for	  regions,	  like	  the	  Middle	  East,	  that	  are	  at	  risk	  of	  Soviet	  growth.	  He	  comments,	  “the	  main	  element	  of	  any	  United	  States	  policy	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  must	  be	  that	  of	  a	  long-­‐term,	  patient	  but	  firm	  and	  vigilant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  David	  Schoenbaum,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1993)59.	  39	  Dwight	  D.	  Eisenhower,	  "The	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine	  on	  the	  Middle	  East,	  A	  
Message	  to	  Congress,	  January	  5,	  1957	  ,"	  XXXV1,	  no.	  917	  (1957b),	  83-­‐87.	  40	  Ibid.	  41	  Mart,	  Eye	  on	  Israel	  :How	  America	  Came	  to	  View	  the	  Jewish	  State	  as	  an	  Ally44	  42	  "Ideological	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.",	  1	  
	  	   15	  
containment	  of	  Russian	  expansive	  tendencies.”43	  He	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviets	  possessed	  the	  power	  to	  pressure	  nations	  to	  associate	  themselves	  with	  the	  communist	  cause.	  He	  continues	  saying;	  	  …the	  free	  institutions	  of	  the	  Western	  world	  is	  something	  that	  can	  be	  contained	  by	  the	  adroit	  and	  vigilant	  application	  of	  counterforce	  at	  a	  series	  of	  constantly	  shifting	  geographical	  and	  political	  points,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  shifts	  and	  maneuvers	  of	  Soviet	  policy,	  but	  which	  cannot	  be	  charmed	  or	  talked	  out	  of	  existence.44	  	  	  According	  to	  Kennan,	  the	  United	  States	  needed	  to	  take	  measures	  to	  thwart	  Soviet	  developments	  in	  areas	  where	  communism	  was	  beginning	  to	  appear.	  In	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  State	  Department	  would	  later	  campaign	  to	  maintain	  relationships	  with	  Arab	  countries,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  rapport	  with	  Israel,	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  falling	  under	  Soviet	  pressures.45	  	  	   The	  United	  States	  containment	  policy	  caused	  the	  United	  States	  to	  enact	  what	  was	  known	  as	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine”	  with	  regard	  to	  established	  and	  forming	  countries,	  like	  Israel.	  A	  year	  before	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  President	  Harry	  Truman	  addressed	  a	  joint	  session	  of	  U.S.	  Congress	  to	  present	  allocations	  for	  the	  new	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.46	  Following	  Kennan’s	  recommendations	  from	  Moscow,	  President	  Truman	  established	  U.S.	  policy	  that	  would	  last	  throughout	  the	  Cold	  War	  until	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  collapse	  in	  1991.	  Truman	  called	  on	  the	  U.S.	  to	  support	  pro-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  George	  Kennan,	  "The	  Policy	  of	  Containment:	  "The	  Sources	  of	  Soviet	  Conduct,"	  July	  1947,"	  in	  THe	  United	  States	  since	  1945:	  A	  Documentary	  Reader,	  eds.	  Robert	  P.	  Ingalls	  and	  David	  K.	  Johnson	  (Oxford:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2009)17.	  44	  Ibid.	  45	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel83	  46	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  "The	  Truman	  Doctrine:	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Address,	  March	  12,	  1947,"	  in	  The	  United	  States	  since	  1945:	  A	  Documentary	  Reader	  (Oxford:	  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	  2009),	  21-­‐23.	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democratic	  nations	  with	  “financial	  and	  economic	  assistance.”47	  Truman	  recommended	  to	  congress	  that	  the	  U.S.	  take	  sweeping	  global	  measures	  to	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  gaining	  stronger	  global	  influence.	  The	  focus	  of	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  was	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  “national	  security”.48	  Truman	  stated	  in	  his	  March	  12,	  1947	  speech	  to	  Congress	  stated	  that:	  	  …one	  of	  the	  primary	  objectives	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  conditions	  in	  which	  we	  and	  other	  nations	  will	  be	  able	  to	  work	  out	  a	  way	  of	  life	  free	  from	  coercion…We	  shall	  not	  realize	  our	  objectives,	  however,	  unless	  we	  are	  willing	  to	  help	  free	  peoples	  to	  maintains	  their	  free	  institutions	  and	  their	  national	  integrity	  against	  aggressive	  movements	  that	  seek	  to	  impose	  upon	  the	  totalitarian	  regimes.49	  	  	  President	  Truman	  wanted	  the	  U.S.	  to	  become	  increasingly	  involved	  in	  foreign	  politics	  to	  stop	  “aggressive	  movements”	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  from	  burgeoning	  in	  areas	  where	  communism	  was	  not	  previously	  prevalent.	  Truman	  argued	  that	  the	  way	  to	  help	  nations	  “maintain	  their	  free	  institutions,”	  was	  by	  “economic	  and	  financial	  aid”	  to	  provide	  “economic	  stability	  and	  orderly	  political	  processes”.50	  	  In	  addition	  to	  financial	  aid,	  President	  Truman	  requested	  that	  Congress	  be	  granted	  the	  authority	  to	  intervene	  in	  countries	  with,	  “American	  civilian	  and	  military	  personnel.”	  The	  “Truman	  Doctrine”	  became	  the	  standard	  upon	  which	  the	  U.S.	  would	  conduct	  its	  foreign	  policy.	  The	  United	  States	  became	  known,	  “to	  support	  free	  peoples	  who	  [resisted]	  attempted	  subjugation	  by	  armed	  minorities	  or	  by	  outside	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Ibid.,	  22.	  	  48	  Ibid.,	  22.	  49	  Ibid.,	  22.	  50	  Ibid.,	  23.	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pressures”.51	  Truman	  believed	  that	  national	  safety	  was	  not	  only	  dependent	  on	  securing	  U.S.	  boarders	  but	  also	  establishing	  a	  pro-­‐American	  presence	  overseas.	  When	  the	  State	  Department,	  Congress,	  and	  the	  President	  had	  to	  establish	  a	  policy	  towards	  what	  was	  expected	  to	  be	  the	  Jewish	  State	  in	  early	  1948	  there	  was	  dissonance	  between	  the	  branches	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government	  regarding	  how	  Israel	  fit	  within	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Truman	  Policy.	  	  Following	  the	  “Truman	  Doctrine”	  the	  United	  States	  made	  a	  commitment	  to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  communist	  backed	  governments.	  Even	  though	  Congress	  would	  pass	  the	  National	  Security	  Act	  of	  1947,	  reorganizing	  the	  national	  military	  establishment,	  the	  State	  Department	  did	  not	  want	  to	  establish	  new	  areas	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  U.S.	  52	  The	  National	  Security	  Act	  resulted	  in	  a	  major	  reorganization	  of	  the	  foreign	  policy	  and	  military	  establishments	  of	  the	  U.S.	  by	  creating	  a	  Department	  of	  Defense	  out	  of	  the	  War	  Department,	  and	  the	  Central	  Intelligence	  Agency.53	  The	  Joint	  Chief’s	  of	  Staff	  were	  also	  formed	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  core	  governing	  body	  for	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  and	  became	  an	  institution	  defending	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  into	  the	  Middle	  East.	  President	  Truman	  wanted	  the	  U.S.	  military	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  internal	  conflicts	  in	  Greece	  and	  Turkey	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  similar	  communist	  insurrections	  from	  spreading	  to	  the	  Middle	  East.	  54	  	   The	  United	  States	  was	  unsure	  whether	  the	  Jewish	  State	  would	  align	  its	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  with	  those	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  State	  Department	  suggested	  that	  Israel	  could	  not	  receive	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Ibid.	  52	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel84	  53	  U.S.	  Office	  of	  the	  Historian,	  "National	  Security	  Act	  of	  1947,"	  http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-­‐1952/NationalSecurityAct2013).	  54	  Grose,	  Israel	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  America253.	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for	  multiple	  reasons,	  including	  that	  the	  country’s	  allegiance	  did	  not	  lie	  strictly	  with	  the	  United	  States.55	  During	  the	  late	  1940’s	  the	  United	  States	  established	  a	  network	  of	  countries	  known	  to	  support	  U.S.	  democratic	  principles	  and	  free	  trade.	  George	  Kennan	  formed	  what	  would	  be	  the	  United	  States	  policy	  of	  containment	  for	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   In	  an	  anonymous	  article	  published	  in	  a	  1947	  journal,	  Foreign	  Affairs,	  George	  Kennan	  expanded	  upon	  his	  propositions	  for	  the	  containment	  of	  Soviet	  communist	  he	  recommended	  in	  in	  his	  Long	  Telegram	  from	  Moscow.	  Kennan’s	  recommendations,	  published	  in	  what	  would	  be	  come	  to	  known	  as	  the	  “X-­‐Article”,	  called	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  take	  concerted	  diplomatic	  efforts	  to	  block	  soviet	  influence	  from	  spreading	  to	  free,	  un-­‐communist,	  and	  independent	  governments.	  Kennan	  argued	  that,	  "The	  main	  element	  of	  any	  United	  States	  policy	  toward	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  must	  be	  that	  of	  a	  long-­‐term,	  patient	  but	  firm	  and	  vigilant	  containment	  of	  Russian	  expansive	  tendencies."56	  To	  effectively	  stop	  the	  Soviets	  from	  expanding	  their	  influence	  Kennan	  stated	  that	  the	  U.S.	  must	  apply,	  "adroit	  and	  vigilant	  application	  of	  counter-­‐force	  at	  a	  series	  of	  constantly	  shifting	  geographical	  and	  political	  points,	  corresponding	  to	  the	  shifts	  and	  maneuvers	  of	  Soviet	  policy."57	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy,	  Kennan	  wrote,	  would	  then	  result	  in	  	  "the	  break-­‐up	  or	  the	  gradual	  mellowing	  of	  Soviet	  power."58	  In	  his	  article	  he	  encouraged	  the	  U.S.	  to	  counter	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  Communist	  allies	  whenever	  and	  wherever	  they	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Schoenbaum,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel83.	  56	  "Kennan	  and	  Containment,	  1947."http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-­‐1952/Kennan	  57	  George	  "X"	  Kennan,	  "The	  Sources	  of	  Soviet	  Conduct,"	  Foreign	  Affairs	  25,	  no.	  4	  (July	  1947,	  1947),	  566-­‐582.	  58	  Ibid.	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threatened	  to	  gain	  influence.	  President	  Truman	  adopted	  Kennan’s	  policy	  and	  increased	  economic	  and	  military	  efforts	  to	  effectively	  contain	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  In	  the	  Middle	  East	  Truman	  would	  adopt	  Kennan’s	  policy	  and	  plan	  to	  increase	  economic	  and	  military	  efforts	  to	  effectively	  contain	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  in	  an	  area	  of	  high	  value,	  because	  of	  oil,	  for	  the	  United	  States.59	  The	  question	  for	  the	  Truman	  administration	  would	  be	  how	  to	  react	  to	  the	  “shifts	  and	  maneuvers	  of	  Soviet	  Policy”	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  because	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  for	  the	  administration	  if	  and	  with	  which	  country,	  including	  the	  Jewish	  State,	  Soviet	  influence	  would	  take	  root.60	  When	  the	  United	  States	  established	  that	  Soviet	  influence	  was	  encroaching	  upon	  the	  Middle	  East	  different	  factions	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government	  debated	  where,	  and	  with	  which	  governments,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  apply	  counter	  pressures.	  	   The	  Marshall	  plan	  was	  also	  integrated	  into	  American	  policy	  towards	  combating	  soviet	  encroachment.	  The	  Marshall	  Plan	  formulated	  in	  1948	  by	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Marshall,	  outlined	  a	  foreign	  policy	  program	  in	  which	  the	  United	  States	  would	  gain	  influence	  in	  post	  World	  War	  II	  Europe,	  in	  order	  to	  drive	  out	  communist	  pressures,	  through	  economic	  support.	  In	  a	  speech	  given	  to	  Harvard	  College’s	  graduating	  class	  on	  June	  5,	  1947,	  Marshall	  stated	  that	  those	  countries	  who	  needed	  financial	  support	  were	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  to	  Soviet	  influence.	  He	  argued	  that	  internal	  and	  external	  communist	  pressures	  threatened	  countries	  still	  recovering	  from	  World	  War	  II.61	  Countries	  affected	  by	  the	  redistribution	  of	  power	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Kennan,	  The	  Policy	  of	  Containment:	  "The	  Sources	  of	  Soviet	  Conduct,"	  July	  194719	  60	  Kennan,	  The	  Sources	  of	  Soviet	  Conduct,	  566-­‐582	  61	  George	  C.	  Marshall,	  The	  "Marshall	  Plan"	  Speech	  at	  Harvard	  University,	  George	  C.	  Marshall,	  Speech,	  1947	  .	  
	  	   20	  
and	  a	  change	  in	  their	  organization	  of	  government	  needed	  to	  be	  supported	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  deter	  countries	  in	  need	  from	  turning	  to	  the	  Soviets	  for	  assistance.	  The	  State	  Department	  took	  into	  great	  consideration	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  give	  foreign	  aid	  to	  Israel,	  to	  show	  support,	  when	  deciding	  how	  the	  U.S.	  would	  conduct	  itself	  with	  Israel	  in	  1949.62	  According	  to	  the	  Marshal	  Plan	  countries	  that	  ally	  their	  ideals	  with	  the	  U.S.	  should	  benefit	  with	  U.S.	  foreign	  aide.	  Many	  State	  Department	  officials	  claimed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  withhold	  all	  foreign	  aid	  in	  the	  form	  of	  military	  support,	  and	  loans	  and	  because	  the	  Jewish	  Agency’s	  affiliation	  with	  Soviet	  communist	  allies	  indicated	  that	  Israel	  was	  already	  oriented	  towards	  a	  Soviet	  alliance.63	  	  	   The	  Jewish	  Agency,	  the	  leading	  authority	  for	  the	  Yishuv	  in	  Palestine,	  was	  also	  hesitant	  to	  commit	  to	  communist	  or	  anti-­‐communist	  diplomatic	  relationships	  leading	  up	  to	  and	  continuing	  after	  Israeli	  Independence.64	  	  The	  Jewish	  Agency	  did	  not	  decide	  whether	  to	  solely	  align	  itself	  with	  the	  United	  States	  or	  Soviet	  Union	  because	  it	  was	  open	  to	  receive	  multiple	  forms	  of	  aid	  to	  support	  the	  central	  Jewish	  fighting	  force	  the	  Hagana.65	  The	  leaders	  of	  the	  Yishuv	  understood	  the	  multiple	  challenges	  that	  the	  new	  government	  would	  have	  to	  confront	  following	  the	  states	  establishment,	  including	  an	  imminent	  attack	  from	  the	  surrounding	  Arab	  nations,	  the	  question	  of	  Arabs	  in	  the	  State	  territory,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  build	  a	  significant	  Jewish	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population	  through	  immigration.66	  The	  government	  leaders	  felt	  it	  would	  be	  most	  prudent	  to	  not	  isolate	  either	  power	  and	  solicit	  support,	  diplomatically	  and	  fiscally,	  from	  both.	  Prior	  to	  the	  declaration	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Yishuv	  depended	  on	  the	  Soviets	  for	  support	  against	  the	  British.67	  While	  fighting	  the	  British	  mandate	  in	  Palestine	  leaders	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Settlements	  and	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  Hagana,	  the	  principle	  group	  of	  Jewish	  armed	  forces,	  sought	  weapons	  from	  the	  Soviets.	  The	  leaders	  including	  Ben	  Gurion,	  who	  would	  be	  the	  first	  prime	  minister	  of	  Israel,	  also	  understood	  the	  reality	  that	  without	  American	  support	  the	  new	  Jewish	  State	  would	  not	  survive	  an	  attack	  from	  the	  surrounding	  Arab	  states.	  	  	   The	  Soviet	  Union,	  under	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  aided	  the	  Yishuv	  by	  defying	  the	  embargo	  placed	  on	  the	  Jews	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  March	  of	  1948.68	  Stalin	  supported	  the	  Yishuv	  war	  efforts	  by	  exporting	  Czechoslovakian	  goods	  and	  weapons	  to	  the	  Jewish	  authorities.69	  Czechoslovakia	  received	  aid	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  following	  no	  financial	  assistance	  from	  the	  U.S.	  under	  the	  Marshall	  Plan.	  The	  Czechs,	  under	  Soviet	  Control,	  supplied	  Israel	  with,	  “50,000	  rifles,	  6,000	  machine	  guns,	  and	  90	  million	  bullets,”	  as	  well	  as	  uniforms,	  following	  an	  agreement	  signed	  in	  January	  of	  1948.70	  The	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  believed	  that	  the	  Yishuv	  would	  become	  a	  base	  of	  Soviet	  activity	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  They	  saw	  the	  transfer	  of	  Czech	  weapons	  to	  the	  Hagana,	  as	  the	  organized	  Jewish	  military	  forces	  in	  Palestine,	  as	  a	  indicator	  of	  the	  Yishuv’s	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socialist	  affiliations.	  The	  Czech	  Coup	  d’état	  by	  Czech	  communist	  exacerbated	  the	  belief	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  that	  the	  Jews	  in	  Palestine	  should	  not	  receive	  support	  from	  the	  United	  States	  because	  of	  their	  socialist	  attributes	  and	  affiliations.71	  	  	  	   The	  State	  Department	  attested	  that	  Israel’s	  relationship	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  affiliated	  nations	  was	  further	  proof	  that	  Israel,	  when	  faced	  with	  the	  choice	  between	  the	  opposing	  powers	  would	  choose	  to	  ally	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  The	  State	  Department	  also	  assumed	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State	  would	  give	  the	  Communist	  more	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  “Such	  operatives	  are	  already	  at	  work	  within	  the	  Jewish	  community	  and	  their	  influences	  will	  be	  enhanced	  so	  long	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  internal	  strife	  continues,	  and	  their	  numbers	  will	  be	  increased	  if	  the	  Jewish	  State	  is	  established.”72	  Members	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  improperly	  linked	  the	  Jewish	  People	  with	  Communist	  ideology.	  	   Furthermore,	  not	  only	  did	  the	  Jewish	  State’s	  foreign	  policy	  not	  correspond	  with	  the	  United	  States	  Cold	  War	  policy,	  but	  according	  to	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  complicated	  other	  U.S.	  Middle	  East	  initiatives.73	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Marshall	  aimed	  to	  avoid	  opening	  up	  an	  additional	  Cold	  War	  theater	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  State	  Department	  predicted	  that	  the	  successful	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State	  would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  war	  in	  the	  region,	  eventually	  leading	  to	  U.S.	  involvement.	  	  	   As	  the	  end	  of	  Great	  Britain’s	  Mandate	  on	  Palestine	  approached	  the	  United	  States	  had	  to	  decide	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  they	  wanted	  with	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  After	  the	  Arab	  and	  Jewish	  authorities	  failed	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  based	  upon	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U.N.	  Resolution	  181,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  proposed	  the	  plan	  to	  place	  Palestine	  under	  a	  United	  Nations	  trusteeship.74	  The	  trusteeship	  plan	  included	  placing	  limits	  on	  Jewish	  immigration	  and	  a	  separation	  of	  Palestine	  into	  divided	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  provinces.75	  The	  provinces	  would	  not	  have	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  an	  independent	  state	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  would	  serve	  as	  the	  autonomous	  body	  until	  both	  sides	  reached	  a	  resolution.76	  	  The	  State	  Department,	  concerned	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  increasing	  Soviet	  role	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  restriction	  by	  Arab	  oil	  producing	  nations	  of	  oil	  supplies	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  advised	  against	  U.S.	  intervention	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Jews.77	  Later,	  as	  the	  date	  for	  British	  departure	  from	  Palestine	  drew	  near,	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  grew	  concerned	  about	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  all-­‐out	  war	  in	  Palestine	  as	  Arab	  states	  threatened	  to	  attack	  almost	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  UN	  passed	  the	  partition	  resolution.78	  	   The	  United	  Nations	  assumed	  a	  large	  role,	  following	  the	  British,	  in	  determining	  the	  outcome	  of	  Palestine	  flowing	  the	  Partition.	  After	  the	  British	  Government	  relinquished	  its	  claims	  over	  Palestine,	  it	  presented	  “the	  Palestinian	  Question”	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly.	  	  The	  General	  Assembly	  was	  charged	  with	  the	  task	  of	  judging	  new	  terms	  of	  the	  Mandate.79	  The	  General	  Assembly	  commissioned	  a	  group	  of	  representatives	  from	  eleven	  countries	  to	  form	  the	  United	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Nations	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Palestine,	  or	  UNSCOP.	  80	  After	  UNSCOP	  evaluated	  the	  situation	  in	  Palestine	  and	  filed	  a	  report	  at	  the	  end	  of	  August	  1947,	  a	  new	  plan	  for	  the	  Mandate	  was	  created	  involving	  two	  separate	  states	  and	  an	  international	  zone.	  81	  The	  resolution	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations,	  and	  accepted	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  on	  November	  29,	  1947,	  known	  United	  Nations	  Resolution	  181,	  achieved	  a	  majority	  for	  a	  two-­‐state	  solution.	  The	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  and	  the	  Jewish	  people	  would	  control	  two	  separate	  sovereign	  states,	  and,	  because	  of	  its	  religious	  importance,	  Jerusalem	  would	  remain	  a	  corpus	  separatum	  under	  international	  control	  of	  the	  United	  Nations.82	  The	  United	  States	  supported	  the	  Partition	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  State	  Department	  continued	  its	  support	  of	  Arab	  interest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  again	  addressed	  the	  President.	  Loy	  Henderson,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Near	  East	  Division,	  along	  with	  George	  Kennan,	  the	  champion	  of	  U.S.	  containment	  policy,	  supported	  its	  case	  against	  partition	  citing	  that	  it	  would	  go	  against	  greater	  U.S.	  strategy	  and	  national	  security.83	  While	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  supported	  the	  plans	  overall,	  the	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  and	  the	  Arab	  countries	  surrounding	  Palestine	  condemned	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  resolution.	  	  	   Soon	  after	  President	  Truman	  took	  office	  on	  April	  2,	  1945	  the	  State	  Department	  expressed	  its	  opinion	  on	  how	  the	  President	  should	  conduct	  affairs	  in	  Palestine.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Edward	  Stettinius	  briefed	  Truman	  on	  the	  Jewish	  Agency’s	  push	  to	  form	  a	  Jewish	  State.	  	  As	  standard	  for	  the	  State	  Department’s	  view,	  Stettinius	  recommended	  to	  Truman	  to	  keep	  American	  interest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Schoenbaum,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel5352.	  81	  Ibid.52.	  82	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  "Resolution	  181,"	  in	  Israel	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  
Documents	  and	  Readings	  on	  Society,	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Pre-­‐1948	  to	  the	  
Present,	  eds.	  Itamar	  Rabinovich	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz	  (Waltham,	  Massachusetts:	  Brandeis	  University	  Press,	  2009)61.	  83	  Schoenbaum,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel56	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high	  priority	  when	  managing	  U.S.	  policy	  towards	  Palestine.84	  Truman	  accepted	  the	  State	  Department	  advice	  in	  the	  initial	  months	  of	  his	  administration.	  	  Under	  the	  recommendation	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Joeseph	  C.	  Grew,	  President	  Truman	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  Arab	  leaders	  assuring	  them	  that,	  “no	  decision	  should	  be	  taken	  respecting	  the	  basic	  situation	  in	  Palestine	  without	  full	  consultation	  with	  both	  Arabs	  and	  Jews.”85	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  King	  Saud	  in	  1946	  President	  Truman	  expressed	  his	  wish	  to	  honor	  the	  previous	  U.S.	  commitments	  to	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  Palestine,	  as	  agreed	  upon	  in	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration,	  but	  also	  maintain	  the	  established	  friendship	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  While	  writing	  to	  King	  Saud	  that	  all,	  “should	  be	  prepared	  for	  self-­‐government	  and	  also	  that	  a	  national	  home	  for	  the	  Jewish	  people,”	  Truman	  also	  assured	  him	  saying	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  “Government,	  in	  outlining	  its	  attitude	  on	  Palestine,	  has	  given	  assurances	  that	  it	  would	  not	  take	  any	  action	  which	  might	  prove	  hostile	  to	  the	  Arab	  people,	  and	  also	  that	  in	  its	  view	  there	  should	  be	  no	  decision	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  basic	  situation	  in	  Palestine	  without	  prior	  consultation	  with	  both	  Arabs	  and	  Jews.”86	  The	  State	  Department	  advised	  President	  Truman	  to	  take	  an	  increasingly	  cautious	  approach	  towards	  the	  Palestinian	  issue	  following	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Arab	  revolts	  in	  Palestine	  and	  increased	  disproval	  from	  Arab	  leaders	  in	  the	  region.87	  	  	   While	  President	  Truman	  upheld	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  without	  much	  question,	  when	  the	  United	  Nation	  moved	  to	  establish	  two	  separate	  sovereign	  entities	  for	  the	  Jews	  and	  the	  Arabs,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  to	  resolve	  a	  conflict	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Snetsinger,	  Truman,	  the	  Jewish	  Vote,	  and	  the	  Creation	  of	  Israel16.	  85	  Ibid.	  86	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  	  Message	  to	  the	  King	  of	  Saudi	  Arabia	  Concerning	  Palestine,	  1946.	  87	  Grose,	  Israel	  in	  the	  Mind	  of	  America,	  89.	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interest	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  United	  Nations	  resolution	  181	  changed	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  Jewish	  national	  home,	  as	  a	  territory	  where	  Jewish	  people	  could	  find	  refuge,	  to	  an	  actual	  state	  with	  authority	  given	  to	  the	  Jewish	  leaders	  to	  determine	  their	  own	  sovereignty.88	  The	  issue	  continued	  to	  become	  more	  complex	  as	  violence	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  region	  due	  to	  Arab	  opposition.	  	  	   President	  Roosevelt	  publically	  praised	  the	  American	  Palestinian	  Committee,	  a	  pro-­‐Zionist	  group	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  endorsed	  the	  group’s	  efforts	  to	  form	  a	  Jewish	  State.	  While	  Roosevelt	  expressed	  his	  support	  to	  Robert	  Wagner,	  the	  co-­‐Chairman	  of	  the	  American	  Palestine	  Committee,	  during	  May	  of	  1942,	  he	  also	  communicated	  with	  Arab	  leaders	  supposedly	  committing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  act	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  Arab	  States.89.	  Concurrently,	  Roosevelt	  supposedly	  offered	  secret	  assurances	  to	  King	  Ibn	  Saud	  saying	  that	  he	  would	  work	  to	  prevent	  a	  Jewish	  State	  from	  forming.	  Word	  of	  the	  secret	  assurances	  from	  Roosevelt	  promised	  to	  King	  Ibn	  Saud	  would	  be	  revealed	  during	  Presidents	  Truman’s	  presidency	  and	  cause	  conflict	  during	  Presidents	  decision	  to	  promote	  a	  Jewish	  State.90	  Later	  revealed	  publically,	  President	  Roosevelt	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  King	  Ibn	  Saud	  in	  1945	  stating	  that,	  “the	  attitude	  of	  the	  American	  Government	  toward	  Palestine”	  had	  the	  desire,	  “that	  no	  decision	  be	  taken	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  basic	  situation	  in	  that	  country	  without	  full	  consultation	  with	  both	  Arabs	  and	  Jews.”91	  To	  Saud,	  Roosevelt	  strove	  to	  secure	  the	  United	  States	  interest	  within	  the	  Arab	  states	  and	  in	  his	  letter	  said,	  “I	  assured	  you	  that	  I	  would	  take	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly,	  Resolution	  181,	  61-­‐63.	  89	  Richard	  B.	  Miller,	  "The	  Moral	  and	  Political	  Burdens	  of	  Memory,"	  Journal	  of	  
Religious	  Ethics	  37,	  no.	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  (09,	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  90	  By	  C.L.	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  By	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  to	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  "INDEPENDENT	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  Franklin	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  Roosevelt,	  Letter	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  Ibn	  Saud,	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  5,	  1945,	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action,	  in	  my	  capacity	  as	  Chief	  of	  the	  Executive	  Branch	  of	  this	  Government,	  which	  might	  prove	  hostile	  to	  the	  Arab	  people.”92	  	  	   In	  early	  1948	  following	  the	  incompletion	  of	  U.N.	  resolution	  181	  and	  building	  tensions	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  sought	  to	  keep	  relationships	  with	  the	  Arab	  States	  positive	  and	  open.	  The	  State	  Department	  urged	  President	  Truman	  to	  remain	  on	  good	  terms	  with	  the	  Arab	  leaders	  not	  only	  to	  protect	  U.S.	  oil	  interest,	  but	  to	  prevent	  the	  Arab	  states	  from	  attaching	  themselves	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  War	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  a	  realistic	  fear	  and	  Britain’s	  mandate	  was	  set	  to	  expire	  in	  months,	  giving	  the	  U.N.	  and	  the	  U.S.	  little	  time	  and	  options	  to	  solve	  the	  Palestine	  issue.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  the	  Palestinian	  issue	  and	  establish	  America’s	  position	  the	  State	  Department,	  under	  direction	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Marshall,	  prepared	  a	  position	  paper	  on	  Palestine.	  The	  draft	  of	  the	  position	  paper	  prepared	  for	  President	  Truman	  titled,	  "The	  Position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  with	  Respect	  to	  Palestine",	  written	  February	  17,	  1948,	  outlines	  multiple	  options	  in	  regard	  to	  handling	  the	  end	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate.	  The	  position	  paper	  also	  included	  a	  relation	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.93	  “Unrestricted	  access	  to	  the	  oil	  resources	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  [that]	  is	  essential	  to	  the	  complete	  economy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  to	  the	  economic	  recovery	  of	  Europe	  under	  the	  ERP.”94	  The	  State	  Department	  worried	  that	  if	  the	  United	  States	  offended	  Arab	  leaders	  including	  King	  Ibn	  Saud,	  then	  the	  United	  States	  main	  supply	  of	  oil	  would	  be	  restricted,	  thus	  hindering	  their	  anti-­‐communist	  operations	  abroad.	  As	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  became	  more	  of	  a	  potential	  reality,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Ibid.	  93	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  "Statement	  by	  the	  President"	  (OF,	  Truman	  Papers,	  Truman	  Library,	  1948b).	  94	  United	  States	  State	  Department,	  The	  Position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  with	  Respect	  to	  
Palestine,	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the	  State	  Department	  believed	  that,	  “the	  oil	  and	  certain	  strategic	  areas	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  will	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  successful	  prosecution	  of	  such	  a	  war	  by	  the	  United	  States.”95	  In	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  State	  Department,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  be	  prepared	  for	  a	  possible	  war	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  was	  necessary	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  continue,	  “a	  friendly	  or	  at	  least	  a	  neutral	  attitude	  by	  the	  Arab	  peoples	  toward	  the	  US	  and	  its	  interest	  is	  requisite	  to	  the	  procurement	  of	  adequate	  quantities	  of	  oil	  for	  the	  purposes	  as	  states	  and	  to	  the	  utilization	  of	  strategic	  areas	  without	  prohibitive	  cost	  in	  the	  event	  of	  war.”	  96	  To	  the	  State	  Department,	  stability	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  depended	  on	  unrestricted	  oil	  access	  and	  an	  assurance	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  gain	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  region.	  	  	   The	  State	  Department	  worried	  that	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  U.N.	  Resolution	  181	  Partition	  Plan	  without	  another	  proposed	  solution	  would	  lead	  to	  security	  risks	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  outlined	  in	  the	  position	  paper,	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  felt	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  effectively	  contain	  the	  Middle	  East	  from	  Communism.	  They,	  “emphasized	  their	  view	  that,	  of	  all	  the	  possible	  eventualities	  in	  the	  Palestine	  situation,	  the	  most	  unfavorable	  in	  the	  security	  interest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  the	  intrusion	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  and,	  second	  only	  to	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  US	  troops	  in	  opposition	  to	  possible	  Arab	  resistance.”97	  Both	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  felt	  that	  Communist	  operatives	  were	  already	  operating	  and	  setting	  groundwork	  for	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  infiltrate	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  position	  paper	  stated	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  had	  plans	  to,	  “exploit	  the	  situation	  in	  Palestine	  to	  its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  Truman,	  Statement	  by	  the	  President.	  96	  Ibid.	  97	  United	  States	  State	  Department,	  The	  Position	  of	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  United	  States	  with	  Respect	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advantage	  [and	  that]	  the	  USSR	  can	  most	  easily	  gain	  a	  lodgment	  in	  the	  Palestine	  to	  its	  advantage…	  by	  introduction	  of	  Soviet	  or	  Soviet-­‐controlled	  forces	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  some	  UN	  section,	  or	  by	  infiltration	  of	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  Communist	  operatives.”98	  The	  United	  States	  would	  then	  be	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  following	  the	  isolation	  of	  the	  Arab	  States	  by	  the	  United	  Stated	  leading	  them	  to,	  “be	  nurtured	  by	  …	  operatives	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  the	  USSR	  and	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	  the	  US.”99	  	  The	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  recommended	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  not	  take	  any	  action	  that	  had	  potential	  to	  orient	  the	  people	  of	  the	  Middle	  East	  away	  from	  the	  Western	  Powers	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  	   After	  the	  State	  Department	  established	  that	  the	  timetable	  for	  executing	  the	  Partition	  Plan	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  implement,	  they	  proposed	  a	  number	  of	  alternative	  plans	  for	  Palestine.	  	  The	  first	  plan	  was	  to	  continue	  to	  support	  the	  Partition	  Plan,	  as	  detailed	  in	  Resolution	  181,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  using	  United	  Nations	  armed	  forces.	  The	  State	  Department	  outlined	  that	  if	  the	  Partition	  Plan	  would	  resume	  as	  scheduled	  then	  the	  Jewish	  State	  would	  inevitably	  come	  under	  attack	  by	  Arabs	  in	  Palestine,	  surrounding	  Arab	  States,	  and	  other	  Moslem	  countries.	  If	  the	  United	  Stated	  would	  support	  the	  Jewish	  State	  with	  arms,	  then,	  the	  State	  Department	  warned,	  then	  the	  U.S.	  would,	  “Alienate	  the	  Moslem	  world	  with	  the	  resultant	  threat	  of:	  1.	  Suspension	  or	  cancellation	  of	  US	  air	  base	  rights	  and	  commercial	  concessions	  including	  oil,	  and	  drastic	  curtailment	  of	  US	  trade	  in	  the	  area.	  2.	  Loss	  of	  access	  to	  British	  air,	  military	  and	  naval	  facilities	  in	  the	  area,	  affecting	  [the	  United	  States]	  strategic	  position	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Mediterranean.”	  3.	  Supplementary	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critiques	  for	  the	  plan	  included	  that	  it	  would,	  “Provide	  a	  vehicle	  for	  Soviet	  expansion	  into	  an	  area	  vial	  to	  [United	  States]	  security	  interest,”	  and	  cause	  a	  deployment	  of,	  “U.S.	  troops	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  there	  is	  high	  probability	  of	  loss	  of	  American	  lives	  and	  which	  might	  result	  in	  war.”	  (United	  States	  State	  Department	  1948,	  1-­‐14)	  After	  the	  State	  Department	  concluded	  that	  the	  Partition	  Plan	  could	  not	  be	  accomplished	  with	  force,	  except	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  they	  developed	  the	  alternative	  plan	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  propose	  to	  the	  United	  Nations.	  	   The	  State	  Department	  proposed	  a	  plan	  to	  reevaluate	  the	  Palestine	  situation	  and	  appoint	  trusteeship	  of	  the	  area	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  until	  further	  resolutions	  were	  prepared.	  Outlined	  under	  plan	  D	  of	  “The	  Position	  of	  the	  United	  States	  with	  Respect	  to	  Palestine",	  the	  recommendation	  was	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to,	  “call	  for	  a	  special	  session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  to	  reconsider	  the	  situation,”	  and,	  “propose	  that	  while	  working	  for	  such	  conciliation	  or	  arbitration,	  a	  special	  session	  of	  the	  General	  Assembly	  be	  called	  to	  consider	  a	  new	  solution	  in	  the	  form	  of	  (1)	  An	  international	  trusteeship.’”100	  	  President	  Truman	  supported	  the	  State	  Department’s	  recommendation	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council,	  but	  did	  not	  want	  the	  trusteeship	  proposal	  to	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  change	  from	  the	  position	  in	  favor	  of	  partition	  that	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Commission	  on	  Palestine	  met	  March	  18,	  1948	  and	  reported	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  that	  it	  had	  unsuccessfully	  to	  coordinate	  any	  compromise	  between	  Jews	  and	  Arabs	  for	  the	  Partition	  Plan.101	  The	  UNSOP	  recommended	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  assume	  a	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  101	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  on	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  General	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  Resolution	  and	  Draft	  of	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  by	  Ambassador	  Austin."(PSF,	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temporary	  trusteeship	  for	  Palestine	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  order	  in	  the	  region.102	  The	  following	  day,	  United	  States	  representative	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Warren	  Austin	  concurred	  with	  the	  UNSOP’s	  conclusions	  and	  stated	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  that	  the	  United	  States	  opinion	  is	  that	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  feasible	  option.	  	   Secretary	  of	  State	  Marshall	  endorsed	  Warren	  Austin’s	  United	  Nations	  testimony	  on	  March	  20,	  stating	  that	  temporary	  United	  Nations	  trusteeship	  for	  Palestine	  would	  allow	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  effectively	  address	  the	  situation	  in	  Palestine.	  President	  Truman	  initially	  subscribed	  to	  the	  State	  Departments	  plan	  to	  grant	  the	  U.N.	  trusteeship	  over	  Palestine.	  In	  a	  released	  statement	  on	  Palestine,	  President	  Truman	  stated,	  during	  a	  press	  conference	  on	  March	  25,	  1948,	  that	  even	  though	  the	  U.S.	  originally	  supported	  the	  UNSCOP	  plan	  for	  partition,	  “it	  has	  become	  clear	  that	  the	  partition	  plan	  cannot	  be	  carried	  out	  at	  this	  time	  by	  peaceful	  means.”103	  President	  Truman	  then	  asserted	  that,	  “The	  United	  States	  has	  proposed	  to	  the	  Security	  Council	  as	  temporary	  United	  Nations	  Trusteeship	  for	  Palestine	  to	  provide	  a	  government	  to	  keep	  the	  peace.”104	  He	  hoped	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  to	  call	  upon	  leaders	  of	  the	  Jewish	  and	  Arab	  communities	  in	  Palestine	  to	  arrange	  a	  truce	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  widespread	  violence	  fallowing	  the	  end	  of	  the	  British	  Mandate	  on	  May	  15.	  The	  trusteeship	  would	  be	  a	  temporary	  means	  to	  keep	  the	  peace	  in	  Palestine	  until	  political	  settlements	  were	  agreed	  upon	  and	  established.	  	  	   The	  United	  Nations	  released	  a	  report	  declining	  the	  recommendations	  of	  the	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  Truman	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trusteeship	  resolution	  previously	  proposed	  by	  United	  States	  representative	  to	  the	  United	  Nations,	  Warren	  Austin.	  The	  Security	  Council	  denied	  the	  Trusteeship	  Plan	  on	  April	  19,	  1948	  and	  suggested	  that	  U.N.	  Resolution	  181	  be	  amended,	  suspended,	  or	  withdrawn	  altogether.105	  Following	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Trustee	  Plan,	  President	  Truman	  reoriented	  his	  position	  on	  Palestine	  and	  the	  probable	  establishment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State.	  While	  the	  State	  Department	  continued	  to	  be	  concerned	  with	  U.S.	  security	  and	  Cold	  War	  interests,	  key	  State	  Department	  officials	  pressured	  President	  Truman	  to	  not	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State	  that	  was	  expected	  to	  form.	  	  	  	   In	  the	  weeks	  before	  the	  British	  Mandate	  was	  scheduled	  to	  end	  the	  State	  Department	  attempted	  to	  pressure	  President	  Truman	  to	  stay	  involved	  in	  the	  Jewish	  state.	  President	  Truman	  had	  to	  consider	  statements	  and	  assurances	  made	  by	  the	  U.S.	  to	  both	  the	  Arabs	  and	  the	  Jews,	  while	  taking	  in	  consideration	  how	  the	  American	  policy	  towards	  a	  Jewish	  State	  United	  States	  standing	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Truman	  was	  unable	  to	  bridge	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  please	  both	  sides.	  	   On	  May	  9,	  less	  than	  a	  week	  before	  the	  British	  Mandate	  was	  scheduled	  to	  end	  President	  Truman	  released	  a	  statement	  outlining	  the	  benefits	  and	  issues	  for	  the	  United	  States	  in	  recognizing	  the	  state	  of	  Israel.	  President	  Truman	  understood	  that	  the	  division	  of	  Palestine	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  based	  on	  the	  Partition	  lines	  from	  Resolution	  181.	  	  President	  Truman	  wanted	  to	  keep	  and	  edge	  and	  realized	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  satellites	  were	  planning	  on	  recognizing	  Israel	  and	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  isolate	  the	  United	  States.106	  Truman	  was	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  recognizing	  the	  Jewish	  State	  driving	  him	  to	  proclaim	  that	  if	  a	  State	  were	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  "Action	  on	  the	  General	  Assembly's	  Resolution	  and	  Draft	  of	  Proposed	  Remarks	  by	  Ambassador	  Austin.",	  1-­‐14.	  106	  Truman,	  Memo	  Supporting	  a	  Statement	  by	  Truman	  Recognizing	  Israel,	  1-­‐5	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be	  created	  it	  would	  receive	  United	  Sates	  recognition.	  In	  the	  President’s	  statement	  he	  said	  that,	  “the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  its	  satellites,	  “might	  even	  announce	  their	  intention	  to	  [recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State]	  in	  advance.”107	  To	  the	  President,	  “Once	  [the	  Soviet	  Union	  has]	  already	  recognized	  the	  Jewish	  State,	  any	  similar	  action	  on	  [the	  United	  States]	  part	  will	  seem	  begrudging.”108	  The	  United	  States	  not	  only	  wanted	  to	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State,	  but	  recognize	  it	  before	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Allowing	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  to	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State	  before	  the	  U.S.	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  “diplomatic	  defeat.”109	  	   President	  Truman	  wanted	  to	  maintain	  his	  promises	  in	  the	  Balfour	  declaration	  and	  solve	  the	  Jewish	  Refugee	  problem	  in	  Europe	  following	  World	  War	  II.	  On	  May	  12,	  President	  Truman	  met	  with	  representatives	  from	  his	  own	  White	  House	  Staff	  along	  with	  State	  Department	  officials.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Marshall,	  Under	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Robert	  Lovett,	  and	  assistant	  and	  Council	  to	  the	  President	  Clark	  Clifford	  attended	  the	  meeting	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office	  to	  discuss	  how	  the	  United	  States	  should	  handle	  Palestine.	  110	  	  The	  State	  Department	  and	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  believed	  that	  official	  U.S.	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State	  would	  hinder	  U.S.	  interests.	  A	  central	  concern	  for	  the	  State	  Department	  was	  American	  oil	  enterprises	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.111	  Fundamentally	  opposed	  to	  a	  founding	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State,	  the	  State	  Department	  argued	  that	  recognizing	  Israel	  would	  block	  America’s	  goals	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  One	  of	  the	  main	  goals,	  as	  cited	  by	  the	  State	  Department,	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was	  to	  secure	  access	  to	  Saudi	  Arabia’s	  oil	  reserve	  and	  control	  oil	  prices.112	  Not	  only	  would	  oil	  be	  in	  question,	  but	  also	  the	  State	  Department	  believed	  that	  a	  Jewish	  State	  would	  lead	  to	  Arab	  extremism	  and	  a	  wave	  of	  violence	  and	  conflict	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.113	  The	  Arabs,	  according	  to	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Marshall,	  would	  turn	  away	  from	  the	  United	  States	  giving	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  a	  base	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  whole	  region.	  	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Marshall,	  so	  opposed	  to	  the	  proposed	  U.S.	  official	  recognition	  of	  a	  Jewish	  State,	  directly	  threatened	  his	  own	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  openly	  during	  the	  famous	  May	  12,	  1948	  “Showdown	  in	  the	  Oval	  Office”	  stating	  that	  if	  President	  Truman	  decided	  to	  support	  a	  new	  Jewish	  State	  that	  he	  would	  lose	  Marshalls	  support	  altogether.	  Marshall	  stated	  that	  he	  would	  abandon	  his	  party	  lines	  and	  his	  administration	  'If	  [Truman]	  followed	  [Clark]	  Clifford's	  advice,”	  to	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State	  that,	  “if	  [he	  was]	  to	  vote	  in	  the	  election,	  [he]	  would	  vote	  against	  [Truman].”114	  In	  opposition	  to	  the	  State	  Department’s	  findings,	  President	  Truman’s	  close	  advisors	  believed	  that	  the	  U.S.	  must	  recognize	  a	  Jewish	  State	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Clark	  Clifford,	  Truman’s	  domestic	  and	  previously	  campaign	  advisor,	  stood	  directly	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  State	  Department’s	  claims.	  According	  to	  Clifford,	  as	  expressed	  in	  his	  March	  1948	  memorandum	  to	  President	  Truman,	  not	  recognizing	  a	  Jewish	  State	  would	  go	  against	  established	  U.S.	  policy.	  115	  	  On	  May	  14,	  1948	  Israel	  declared	  its	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independence	  and	  the	  United	  States	  was	  the	  first	  nation	  to	  grant	  de	  facto	  recognition	  to	  the	  new	  Jewish	  State—11	  minutes	  after	  the	  proclamation.116	  	  The	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  did	  not	  develop	  instantly	  following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel.	  The	  “special	  relationship”	  that	  many	  characterize	  the	  two	  countries	  possessing	  took	  decades	  to	  fully	  cultivate	  following	  multiple	  contentious	  events	  between	  the	  two	  nations.	  Both	  nations	  took	  time	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  diplomatic	  covenant	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  to	  follow	  today.	  Initially,	  the	  United	  States	  felt	  that	  an	  allegiance	  with	  Israel	  possessed	  the	  potential	  to	  impair	  American	  foreign	  and	  Cold	  War	  policy	  objectives	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Eventually,	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  affiliation	  would	  lead	  to	  bi-­‐lateral	  relations	  unparalleled	  with	  any	  other	  country	  allied	  with	  the	  U.S..	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Chapter	  3:	  Following	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State	  	  President	  Truman	  decided	  to	  recognize	  Israel	  in	  1948	  not	  to	  mollify	  domestic	  pressures	  from	  the	  American	  Zionist	  community,	  but	  to	  American	  foreign	  interests.	  The	  United	  States	  reputation	  diminished	  within	  the	  United	  Nations	  following	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  trusteeship	  plan.	  Truman	  felt	  it	  was	  beneficial	  to	  cause	  less	  controversy	  and	  adhering	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  policies	  the	  United	  States	  agreed	  to.	  The	  preexisting	  agreements	  included	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  original	  partition	  plan	  as	  described	  in	  U.N.	  Resolution	  181	  and	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  for	  a	  Jewish	  National	  Home.	  Recognizing	  the	  Jewish	  State	  fulfilled	  the	  United	  States	  commitment	  to	  both	  doctrines.117	  	  Some	  argue	  that	  President	  Truman	  decided	  to	  recognize	  Israel	  in	  1948	  because	  of	  domestic	  pressures	  from	  the	  American	  Zionist	  community.	  	  Truman	  made	  that	  decision,	  in	  that	  case,	  to	  recognize	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community	  that	  supported	  Israel	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  their	  vote	  in	  the	  upcoming	  election.118	  	  President	  Truman	  only	  met	  with	  Chaim	  Weizman,	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Zionist	  Organization	  and	  the	  first	  President	  of	  Israel,	  only	  after	  Eddie	  Jacobson,	  the	  president’s	  long	  time	  friend,	  urged	  him	  multiple	  times.	  	  David	  Niles,	  one	  of	  President	  Truman’s	  close	  assistant	  and	  political	  advisors,	  also	  pressed	  the	  President	  to	  meet	  with	  Zionist	  leaders	  and	  assist	  the	  Zionist	  cause.	  Mounting	  domestic	  demands	  from	  the	  Jews	  in	  the	  United	  States	  who	  wanted	  a	  Jewish	  State,	  and	  held	  considerable	  voting	  power	  for	  the	  Democratic	  Party,	  President	  Truman	  decided	  to	  recognize	  the	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Jewish	  State	  for	  reasons	  apart	  from	  the	  appeals	  of	  his	  personal	  friends	  and	  pressure	  from	  American	  Jews.	  Two	  days	  before	  the	  President	  would	  recognize	  Israel	  Clark	  Clifford,	  counsel	  to	  the	  President,	  argued	  that,	  “In	  an	  area	  as	  unstable	  as	  the	  Middle	  East,	  where	  there	  is	  not	  now	  and	  never	  has	  been	  any	  tradition	  of	  democratic	  govern-­‐ment,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  the	  long-­‐range	  security	  of	  our	  country,	  and	  indeed	  the	  world,	  that	  a	  nation	  committed	  to	  the	  democratic	  system	  be	  established	  there,	  one	  on	  which	  we	  can	  rely.	  The	  new	  Jewish	  state	  can	  be	  such	  a	  place.	  We	  should	  strengthen	  it	  in	  its	  infancy	  by	  prompt	  recognition.”	  119	  Clifford	  made	  the	  point	  to	  the	  President	  that	  by	  recognizing	  Israel	  the	  United	  States	  had	  potential	  to	  obtain	  a	  democratic	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Clifford	  also	  claimed	  that	  recognition	  would	  restore	  the	  President’s	  firm	  position	  in	  encouraging	  of	  the	  partition	  of	  Palestine	  into	  two	  states.	  Clifford	  told	  the	  President,	  “such	  a	  move	  should	  be	  taken	  quickly,	  before	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  or	  any	  other	  nation	  recognizes	  the	  Jewish	  state.”120	  	   The	  United	  States	  recognized	  Israel	  of	  a	  de	  facto	  basis	  eleven	  minutes	  after	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Jewish	  Agency	  Executive,	  proclaimed	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  Eliahu	  Epstein	  as	  representative	  of	  the	  Provisional	  Government	  of	  Israel	  wrote	  to	  President	  Truman:	  	  to	  notify	  [him]	  you	  that	  the	  state	  of	  Israel	  has	  been	  proclaimed	  as	  an	  independent	  republic	  within	  frontiers	  approved	  by	  the	  General	  Assembly	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  its	  Resolution	  of	  November	  29,	  1947,	  and	  that	  a	  provisional	  government	  has	  been	  charged	  to	  assume	  the	  rights	  and	  duties	  of	  government	  for	  preserving	  law	  and	  order	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Israel,	  for	  defending	  the	  state	  against	  external	  aggression,	  and	  for	  discharging	  the	  obligations	  of	  Israel	  to	  the	  other	  nations	  of	  the	  world	  in	  accordance	  with	  international	  law.	  The	  Act	  of	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Independence	  will	  become	  effective	  at	  one	  minute	  after	  six	  o'clock	  on	  the	  evening	  of	  14	  May	  1948,	  Washington	  time.	  121	  	  The	  White	  House	  released	  an	  official	  statement	  that	  read,	  "This	  Government	  has	  been	  informed	  that	  a	  Jewish	  state	  has	  been	  proclaimed	  in	  Palestine,	  and	  recognition	  has	  been	  requested	  by	  the	  provisional	  government	  thereof.	  The	  United	  States	  recognizes	  the	  provisional	  government	  as	  the	  de	  facto	  authority	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel."	  122	  	   President	  Truman	  received	  a	  lot	  of	  criticism	  for	  his	  decision	  from	  members	  within	  his	  own	  administration.	  United	  States	  representative	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  Warren	  Austin,	  who	  pushed	  the	  U.N.	  Trusteeship	  Plan	  for	  Palestine,	  left	  his	  office	  at	  the	  United	  Nations	  in	  protest	  of	  the	  White	  Houses	  declaration.	  Even	  though	  he	  himself	  was	  opposed	  to	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  President,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Marshall	  sent	  a	  State	  Department	  official	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  prevent	  the	  entire	  United	  States	  delegation	  from	  resigning.	  	   The	  United	  States,	  understood	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  planned	  to	  recognize	  the	  new	  Jewish	  State	  after	  its	  declaration.	  President	  Truman,	  in	  competition	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  wanted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  United	  States	  support	  before	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  recognize	  the	  Jewish	  State.	  On	  May	  18,	  1948	  Soviet	  Foreign	  Minister,	  Vyacheslav	  Molotov	  notified	  Israel	  of	  the	  USSR's	  decision	  to	  grant	  full	  de	  jure	  recognition.123	  He	  asserted	  that	  the	  "Soviet	  Government	  hopes	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Eliahu	  Epstein,	  Correspondence	  between	  Eliahu	  Epstein,	  Chaim	  Weizmann,	  and	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  with	  related	  material,	  August	  22,	  1949,	  1949.	  122	  "Statement	  from	  President	  Truman	  Recognizing	  Israel."http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photos/israel.jpg,	  http://www.trumanlibrary.org/photos/israel.jpg	  123	  L.	  Carl	  Brown,	  Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  :The	  International	  Relations	  of	  
Regional	  and	  Outside	  Powers,	  Vol.	  18	  (London;	  New	  York:	  I.B.	  Tauris,	  2001)81.	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establishment	  of	  the	  sovereign	  independent	  state	  by	  the	  Jewish	  People	  will	  serve	  to	  strengthen	  peace	  and	  security	  in	  Palestine	  and	  the	  Near	  East,	  and	  it	  expresses	  its	  faith	  in	  the	  development	  of	  friendly	  relations	  between	  the	  Union	  of	  Soviet	  Socialist	  Republics	  and	  the	  State	  of	  Israel."124	  	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  the	  first	  superpower	  to	  extend	  de	  jure.	  Although	  Washington	  preceded	  Moscow	  in	  endorsing	  the	  Jewish	  State,	  it	  had	  only	  accorded	  de	  facto	  recognition	  over	  de	  jure	  recognition	  that	  would	  acknowledge	  legal	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  new	  state.125	  The	  Jewish	  Agency	  of	  Palestine,	  the	  governing	  body	  of	  the	  Yishuv	  that	  would	  form	  into	  the	  first	  Israeli	  government,	  in	  the	  Proclamation	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  declared	  the	  new	  state	  and	  defined	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  new	  country.	  Immigration	  and	  the	  growth	  of	  new	  countries	  population	  was	  a	  main	  goal	  described	  in	  the	  proclamation	  of	  the	  new	  state,	  now	  officially	  named	  Israel.	  The	  declaration	  stated	  that,	  “The	  State	  of	  Israel	  [would]	  be	  open	  to	  the	  immigration	  of	  Jews	  from	  all	  countries	  of	  their	  dispersion.”126	  In	  order	  to	  build	  a	  sustainable	  country	  that	  would	  survive	  its	  infancy	  against	  its	  surrounding	  enemies	  and	  pending	  attack	  the	  new	  government	  aimed	  at	  attracting,	  “the	  Jewish	  people	  all	  over	  the	  world	  to	  rally	  to	  [Israel’s]	  side	  in	  the	  task	  of	  immigration	  and	  to	  stand	  by	  [it]	  in	  the	  great	  struggle	  for	  the	  fulfillment,”	  of	  a	  Jewish	  state.”127	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  124	  Binyamin	  Pinkus,	  "Change	  and	  Continuity	  in	  Soviet	  Policy	  Towards	  Soviet	  Jewry	  and	  Israel,	  may-­‐December	  1948,"	  Israel	  Studies	  10,	  no.	  1	  (Spring	  2005,	  2005),	  96-­‐123.	  125	  Mart,	  Eye	  on	  Israel	  :How	  America	  Came	  to	  View	  the	  Jewish	  State	  as	  an	  Ally300	  126	  Jewish	  Agency	  Executive,	  "Proclamation	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel,"	  in	  Israel	  in	  the	  
Middle	  East	  Documents	  and	  Readings	  on	  Society,	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Pre-­‐
1948	  to	  the	  Present,	  eds.	  Itamar	  Rabinovich	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz	  (Waltham,	  Massachusetts:	  Brandeis	  University	  Press,	  1948),	  73.	  127	  Ibid.73.	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Following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Jewish	  State	  and	  its	  recognition	  by	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  the	  Provisional	  Government	  was	  tasked	  with	  the	  challenge	  of	  defining	  the	  character	  of	  the	  new	  government.	  Israel	  would	  implicitly	  isolate	  or	  embrace	  the	  United	  States	  by	  defining	  the	  internal	  characteristics	  of	  what	  would	  become	  the	  Israeli	  government.	  The	  United	  States	  would	  not	  have	  received	  the	  new	  government	  as	  agreeably	  if	  it	  decided	  to	  posses	  more	  socialistic	  policies	  and	  tend	  to	  center	  around	  Soviet	  politics.	  The	  ideological	  riff	  between	  the	  more	  socialistic	  factions	  of	  the	  provisional	  government	  and	  the	  more	  progressive	  democratic	  parties	  caused	  debates	  among	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  new	  government.	  	  At	  is	  establishment;	  it	  was	  ambiguous	  how	  Israel	  would	  orient	  itself	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  two	  major	  world	  powers.	  The	  contention	  between	  ideological	  factions	  within	  the	  provisional	  government	  of	  Israel	  forced	  the	  government	  to	  make	  critical	  decisions	  that	  would	  affect	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Israel	  needed	  aid	  and	  support	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  its	  survival	  and	  provide	  the	  means	  necessary	  to	  defend	  itself	  from	  surrounding	  enemies	  and	  obtain	  influence	  in	  the	  international	  arena.	  External	  support	  was	  necessary,	  but	  domestic	  political	  parties	  argued	  with	  which	  nation	  Israel	  should	  appeal	  to	  for	  support.	  	  	   With	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  Israel	  to	  maintain	  beneficial	  relations	  with	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  even	  though	  both	  recognized	  Israel.	  Officially,	  Israel	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐identification	  with	  the	  both	  powers.	  Previous	  to	  its	  establishment,	  the	  Jewish	  State	  relied	  on	  Soviet	  satellites	  in	  Eastern	  Europe	  for	  arms	  and	  needed	  to	  maintain	  a	  supply	  of	  arms	  to	  combat	  its	  regional	  enemies	  during	  the	  War	  of	  Independence.	  The	  United	  States,	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alternatively,	  potentially	  could	  support	  Israel	  with	  economic	  aid	  as	  it	  did	  with	  other	  nations	  under	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  Marshall	  Plan.	  	  An	  ideological	  division	  existed	  within	  the	  group	  of	  Israel’s	  founding	  fathers.	  Soviet	  and	  Eastern	  European	  Marxist	  ideology	  influenced	  a	  portion	  of	  Israel’s	  leaders.	  Many	  of	  them	  came	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  formed	  the	  Israeli	  communist	  party	  and	  Mapam,	  the	  Israeli	  Marxist-­‐Zionist	  party.	  Even	  the	  more	  moderate	  Mapai,	  Israel’s	  labor	  party,	  sought	  guidance	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Mapam	  consisted	  of	  two	  parties	  both	  with	  socialist	  roots.	  Achdut	  Ha’avodah	  led	  by	  Yitzah	  Tabenkin	  believed	  in	  Marxist	  Zionism	  and	  campaigned	  for,	  “maximalist	  boarders	  and	  a	  struggle	  against	  Arab	  reactionaries.”128	  The	  second	  party	  Hashomer	  Hatzair	  had	  a	  “much	  more	  concillitory”	  policy	  “towards	  the	  prospect	  of	  a	  return”	  of	  Jewish	  immigrants	  “and	  a	  renewed	  Jewish-­‐Arab	  solidarity.”129	  Israel’s	  first	  foreign	  minister,	  Moshe	  Sharett	  pushed	  for	  Israel	  not	  to	  align	  or	  identify	  with	  either	  of	  the	  opposing	  powers	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  all	  diplomatic	  options	  available	  for	  the	  new	  state.	  He	  felt	  that	  if	  the	  new	  state	  expressed	  exclusivity	  towards	  one	  power	  prematurely,	  then	  the	  country	  would	  loose	  other	  opportunities	  risking	  the	  survival	  of	  the	  Israel.	  Israel	  upheld	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐alignment	  until	  1956	  following	  the	  Suez	  Crisis.	  Israel’s	  first	  Prime	  Minster	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  did	  not	  retain	  his	  leftist	  ideology	  he	  championed	  before	  1948.	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  separated	  himself	  from	  the	  political	  parties	  on	  the	  far	  left	  and	  opposed	  Mapam.	  130	  Prior	  to	  the	  first	  parliamentary	  elections	  multiple	  leftist	  and	  moderate	  factions	  debated	  the	  content	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  Shindler,	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Israel,	  47.	  129	  Ibid.47.	  130	  Mart,	  Eye	  on	  Israel	  :How	  America	  Came	  to	  View	  the	  Jewish	  State	  as	  an	  Ally,	  71.	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of	  Israel’s	  constitution.	  The	  fundamental	  ideological	  differences	  between	  the	  states	  leaders	  caused	  the	  drafting	  of	  a	  state	  constitution	  a	  lengthy	  process.	  The	  various	  parties	  held	  conflicting	  opinions	  in	  matters	  of	  religion,	  politics,	  and	  the	  county’s	  foreign	  affairs.	  Socialist	  and	  antisocialist	  parties	  disagreed	  on	  what	  principles	  that	  would	  define	  Israeli	  society	  should	  be	  included	  in	  the	  constitution.	  Mapam	  representative	  Yisrael	  Bar-­‐Yehuda	  argued	  that	  the,	  “basic	  rules	  [that]	  should	  be	  formulated,	  which	  will	  obligate	  everyone,…[should	  include]	  the	  ingathering	  of	  exiles-­‐the	  process	  of	  transferring	  masses	  of	  Jews	  to	  Eretz	  Israel,	  and	  that	  not	  only	  from	  the	  geographical	  aspect	  but	  also	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  turning	  them	  into	  citizens	  and	  workers	  in	  our	  country.”131.	  He	  used	  Communist	  rhetoric	  in	  propositions	  for	  the	  Israeli	  constitution	  and	  believed	  in	  a	  “national	  revolution”132	  .Mapam	  at	  its	  founding	  conference	  stated	  it	  would	  establish,	  “A	  workers	  regime…a	  classless	  socialist	  society	  and	  a	  world	  of	  international	  fraternity,”	  while	  supporting	  a,	  “firm	  alliance	  between	  the	  workers	  of	  the	  world	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  first	  workers’	  state…and	  fulfilling	  the	  historic	  mission	  of	  the	  October	  revolution.”	  CITE	  ‘The	  Unity	  Programme	  of	  Mapam	  in	  Peretz	  Marchav,	  The	  Israeli	  Left	  (London,	  1980)	  p.115	   Israel	  held	  its	  first	  Knesset	  elections	  in	  January	  1949	  and	  defined	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  new	  nation.	  The	  largest	  majority	  would	  form	  a	  government	  led	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister.133	  In	  the	  first	  Israeli	  election	  twenty-­‐one	  parties	  struggles	  for	  recognition	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  Israel	  First	  Knesset,	  "The	  Debate	  on	  a	  Constitution,"	  in	  Israel	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  
Documents	  and	  Readings	  on	  Society,	  Politics,	  and	  Foreign	  Relations,	  Pre-­‐1948	  to	  the	  
Present,	  eds.	  Itamar	  Rabinovich	  and	  Jehuda	  Reinharz,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Waltham,	  Massachusetts:	  Brandeis	  University	  Press,	  2008)100.	  132	  Ibid.,	  100.	  133	  Shindler,	  A	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including	  the	  Israeli	  Communist	  Party	  and	  the	  social	  democratic	  party	  Mapai.134	  Even	  though	  Mapai	  won	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  seats,	  followed	  by	  Mapam,	  Prime	  Minister	  Ben	  Gurion	  chose	  not	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  between	  the	  two	  parties.	  	  Rather	  then	  make	  a	  coalition	  with	  a	  strong	  majority	  within	  parliament	  Ben	  Gurion	  chose	  not	  to	  form	  a	  “narrow	  socialist	  coalition	  but	  a	  broader	  coalition	  which	  included	  the	  Religious	  and	  the	  Progressives.”135	  	  Ben	  Gurion	  stayed	  consistent	  in	  his	  policy	  of	  non-­‐alignment	  and	  did	  not	  want	  to	  form	  a	  coalition	  with	  pro-­‐Soviet	  Mapam.	  Even	  though	  Ben	  Gurion	  previously	  held	  a	  belief	  in	  Zionism	  that	  contained	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  foundations,	  he	  did	  not	  want	  to	  pursue	  a	  strong	  attachment	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  so	  early	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  136	  By	  not	  choosing	  to	  align	  with	  Mapam	  and	  alienate	  either	  superpower	  Ben	  Gurion	  received	  promise	  of	  a	  100	  million	  dollar	  loan	  guarantee	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  Mapam	  gained	  only	  two	  ministerial	  positions,	  thus	  solidifying	  Ben	  Gurions	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐Communism.137	  	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  extend	  de	  Jure	  recognition	  of	  Israel	  until	  January	  31,	  1949.	  The	  United	  States	  withheld	  de	  Jure	  recognition	  of	  Israel	  until	  	  Israel	  formed	  a	  permanent	  governing	  body,	  as	  it	  has	  done	  on	  October	  24,	  1948.	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  first	  Israeli	  government	  elections	  took	  place	  on	  January	  25,	  and	  a	  non-­‐socialist	  coalition	  was	  formed,	  did	  President	  Truman	  release	  press	  statement	  legally	  recognizing	  the	  state.138	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On	  February	  14,	  1949	  the	  first	  Israeli	  Knesset	  Election	  took	  place	  and	  resulted	  in	  a	  parliament	  orientated	  towards	  the	  American	  ideology.	  Mapai	  formed	  the	  majority	  coalition	  with	  the	  religious	  party	  Shas	  leaving	  the	  socialist	  Mapam	  without	  significant	  influence.	  Coalition	  government	  signified	  a	  shift	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  Communist	  qualities	  associated	  with	  the	  early	  Jewish	  State.	  David	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  promoted	  democratic	  state.139	  During	  February	  of	  1949,	  Israel	  released	  a	  number	  of	  domestic	  reports	  citing	  the	  increasing	  relations	  with	  the	  United	  States	  among	  the	  country’s	  main	  goals.140	  Israel	  also	  oriented	  itself	  away	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  following	  the	  Soviet	  Unions	  shift	  away	  from	  Israel	  and	  its	  limitation	  of	  Jewish	  emigration	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  In	  February	  1949	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  legally	  denounced	  Zionism	  and	  prohibited	  the	  emigration	  of	  Jews	  to	  Palestine.	  Out	  of	  the	  2	  million	  Jews	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  only	  a	  small	  portion	  were	  allowed	  to	  immigrate	  to	  Israel	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  Israeli	  government.141	  	  The	  surrounding	  Arab	  countries	  condemned	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  and	  launched	  an	  attack	  on	  the	  new	  state	  the	  same	  day	  of	  its	  declaration.	  One	  of	  the	  biggest	  consequences	  of	  The	  Israeli	  War	  for	  Independence	  that	  caused	  the	  first	  major	  discord	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  was	  the	  displacement	  of	  Palestinian	  Arabs	  following	  the	  war.	  In	  the	  months	  after	  Israel’s	  declaration	  of	  independence	  international	  attention	  was	  drawn	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  Palestinian	  refugees	  who	  fled	  the	  battle	  areas.	  The	  displaced	  Palestinian	  refugees	  did	  not	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receive	  asylum	  from	  the	  surrounding	  Arab	  countries	  and	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  terms	  of	  U.N.	  resolution	  181	  to	  form	  their	  own	  state.142	  Hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  refugees	  fled	  Arab	  establishments	  in	  Israel	  for	  multiple	  reasons	  including	  evacuation	  of	  behalf	  of	  Arab	  leaders	  and	  the	  encroaching	  war	  on	  Israeli	  territory.	  	  International	  concern	  for	  the	  situation	  grew	  as	  the	  number	  of	  Arab	  refugees	  increased.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  commission	  of	  a	  U.N.	  special	  envoy	  led	  by	  Folke	  Bernadotte	  to	  examine	  the	  situation	  and	  propose	  a	  solution	  for	  the	  refugees.	  Bernadotte	  recommended	  repatriation	  for	  the	  refugees.143	  	  The	  United	  Nations	  proposed	  and	  implemented	  United	  Nations	  General	  Assembly	  Resolution	  194	  on	  December	  11,	  1948.	  The	  Resolution	  called	  for	  a	  return	  of	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees	  to	  Israel	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  “Conciliation	  Commission”	  consisting	  of	  France,	  Turkey,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  to	  conduct	  the	  coordinate	  the	  resolution	  on	  both	  sides.	  The	  Resolution	  resolved	  that,	  “the	  refugees	  wishing	  to	  return	  to	  their	  homes	  and	  live	  at	  peace	  with	  their	  neighbors	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  do	  so	  at	  the	  earliest	  practicable	  date,	  and	  that	  compensation	  should	  be	  paid	  for	  the	  property	  of	  those	  choosing	  not	  to	  return.”144	  The	  Resolution	  also	  defined	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  “Conciliation	  Commission”	  as,	  “to	  facilitate	  the	  repatriation,	  resettlement	  and	  economic	  and	  social	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  refugees	  and	  the	  payment	  of	  compensation.”145	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The	  United	  States	  agreed	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  U.N.	  resolution	  194	  and	  urged	  Israel	  to	  accept	  the	  resolutions	  conditions.	  The	  Israeli	  Provisional	  government	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  terms	  of	  repatriation	  because	  they	  aimed	  at	  increasing	  Jewish	  immigration	  to	  build	  a	  strong	  Jewish	  presence	  in	  the	  new	  state.	  146	  Immigration	  was	  one	  of	  the	  new	  states	  main	  goals,	  along	  with	  securing	  the	  countries	  boarders,	  and	  Israeli	  leaders	  felt	  that	  the	  return	  of	  Palestinian	  refugees	  to	  Israel	  threatened	  both	  goals.	  Israel	  did	  not	  accept	  the	  right	  of	  return	  for	  the	  Palestinian	  refugees.	  	  Previous	  to	  U.N.	  Resolution	  194	  Moshe	  Sharett	  expressed	  his	  concerns	  with	  the	  300,000	  Arab	  refugees.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Folke	  Bernadotte	  Sharett	  exclaimed	  that	  the	  Arab	  refugees	  could	  not	  be	  readmitted	  into	  Israel	  until	  the	  conflict	  between	  Israel	  and	  its	  neighbors	  ended.147	  Sharett	  wrote:	  The	  Palestinian	  Arab	  exodus	  of	  1948	  is	  one	  of	  those	  cataclysmic	  phenomena	  which,	  according	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  other	  countries,	  changed	  the	  course	  of	  history.	  It	  is	  too	  early	  to	  say	  exactly	  how	  and	  in	  what	  measure	  the	  exodus	  will	  affect	  the	  future	  of	  Israel	  and	  the	  neighboring	  countries.	  	  	  Sharett	  worried	  for	  Israel’s	  security	  and	  felt	  that	  the	  refugees	  would	  become	  militants	  against	  Israel	  from	  within	  the	  state	  itself	  if	  readmitted.	  Chaim	  Weitzman,	  the	  first	  President	  of	  Isreal,	  concurred	  with	  Sharett	  and	  felt	  that	  the	  displaced	  Arabs	  should	  not	  be	  readmitted	  and	  that	  Israel	  must	  maintain	  its	  Jewish	  majority.148	  	   The	  United	  States	  urged	  Israel	  to	  readmit	  refugees	  despite	  the	  Israeli	  governments	  stance	  against	  it.	  At	  the	  Lausane	  Conference	  in	  April	  1949	  the	  United	  States	  met	  with	  the	  Palestinian	  refugee	  delegation	  and	  compelled	  Israel	  to	  readmit	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250,000	  refugees.149	  During	  the	  summer	  of	  1949	  the	  United	  States	  convinced	  Israel,	  though	  reluctant,	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  refugee	  solution	  that	  repatriated	  100,000	  Arab	  refugees	  in	  a	  general	  settlement	  in	  August	  of	  that	  year,	  but	  was	  ultimately	  condemned	  by	  the	  Arabs	  outside	  of	  Israel.150	  Following	  a	  lack	  of	  progress	  between	  the	  parties	  a	  stalemate	  left	  the	  issue	  unresolved	  during	  the	  next	  decade.	  	  	   The	  Tripartite	  Declaration	  was	  agreed	  upon	  on	  25	  May,	  1950	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  Britain	  and	  France.	  The	  joint	  declaration	  was	  issued	  to	  regulate	  the	  supply	  of	  weapons	  into	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  Western	  control	  in	  the	  region.	  The	  Western	  powers	  aimed	  to	  monopolize	  the	  over	  the	  supply	  of	  arms	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  from	  gaining	  a	  foothold.151	  	  Israeli	  leaders	  felt	  that	  the	  Tripartite	  Declaration	  was	  unfavorable	  towards	  Israel	  because	  it	  limited	  Canadian	  weapons	  from	  reaching	  Israel.152	  Prime	  Minister	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  stated	  to	  the	  Knesset	  on	  31	  May	  1950	  that	  the	  Western	  powers	  aimed	  at	  facilitating	  a	  stabile	  arms	  program	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  June	  1950	  introduced	  a	  new	  relationship	  between	  Israel	  and	  the	  U.S.	  prompted	  or	  at	  least	  enabled	  Israel	  to	  abandon	  the	  policy	  of	  non-­‐identification.153	  The	  decision	  was	  made	  easier	  for	  Israel	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  was	  allied	  to	  the	  North	  Korean	  aggressors	  whereas	  the	  United	  States	  fought	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  repel	  the	  aggression	  and	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  151	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  Tripartite	  Declaration	  regarding	  the	  Armistice	  Borders	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restore	  the	  status	  quo	  ante.	  In	  the	  Knesset,	  on	  July	  4,	  1950,	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  presented	  Israel's	  vote	  for	  the	  resolution	  condemning	  the	  North	  Korean	  aggression	  as	  a	  vote	  for	  the	  United	  Nations	  and	  for	  the	  principles	  it	  embodied.	  He	  rejected	  the	  suggestion	  of	  left-­‐wing	  members	  of	  the	  Knesset	  that	  Israel	  should	  abstain,	  arguing	  that	  Israel	  was	  a	  fully-­‐fledged	  member	  of	  the	  community	  of	  nations	  with	  a	  duty	  to	  make	  a	  stand,	  on	  this	  as	  on	  any	  other	  international	  issue,	  based	  on	  the	  dictates	  of	  its	  conscience.	  His	  government,	  however,	  did	  not	  offer	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  fight	  under	  the	  U.N.	  banner	  in	  Korea.	  The	  real	  significance	  of	  its	  stand	  in	  the	  Korean	  conflict	  therefore	  was	  that	  it	  marked	  the	  decisive	  break	  at	  the	  declaratory	  level	  with	  the	  policy	  of	  non-­‐identification.	  Following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Israel	  moved	  towards	  de	  facto	  alignment	  with	  the	  West.	  Israel’s	  move	  towards	  the	  U.S.	  “was	  catalyzed	  by	  the	  need	  for	  arms	  and	  economic	  aid,	  rationalized	  by	  the	  perception	  of	  renewed	  Soviet	  hostility,	  and	  eased	  by	  the	  indifference	  of	  the	  Third	  World.”154	  	  Three	  factors	  motivated	  Ben-­‐Gurion’s	  tilt	  from	  East	  to	  West.	  First,	  was	  the	  diminished	  number	  of	  immigrants	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  to	  Israel.	  These	  immigrants	  tended	  to	  vote	  for	  Mapai.155	  	  Once	  immigration	  from	  the	  Eastern	  bloc	  slowed	  down	  to	  a	  trickle,	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  became	  less	  supportive	  of	  Israel.	  Second,	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  wanted	  to	  gain	  the	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  following	  Israel’s	  dwindling	  support	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Third,	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  sought	  reparations	  from	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  for	  the	  crimes	  that	  Nazi	  Germany	  had	  committed	  against	  the	  Jewish	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people.156	  	  He	  understood	  that	  there	  was	  essentially	  no	  chance	  of	  success	  in	  this	  controversial	  venture	  without	  American	  backing.	  Once	  Ben-­‐Gurion	  shifted	  away	  from	  the	  policy	  of	  non-­‐identification	  he	  approached	  the	  United	  States	  for	  arms	  and	  for	  economic	  assistance	  in	  meeting	  the	  cost	  of	  absorbing	  the	  immigrants	  who	  arrived	  in	  large	  numbers	  from	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  from	  the	  Arab	  countries.	  He	  also	  dropped	  heavy	  hints	  that	  Israel	  would	  like	  to	  be	  included	  in	  any	  military	  alliances	  that	  the	  Western	  powers	  might	  develop	  with	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  forces	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.157	  	   Ben-­‐Gurion	  decided	  to	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  move	  Israel	  towards	  the	  western	  powers	  after	  Israel’s	  departure	  from	  socialist	  based	  ties.	  The	  new	  Israeli	  government	  championed	  democratic	  policies	  but	  still	  remained	  on	  shaky	  terms	  with	  the	  U.S.	  In	  1952	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson	  and	  Truman	  rejected	  an	  Israeli	  request	  for	  $150	  Million	  in	  fiscal	  year	  1952	  as	  part	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  Aid.	  On	  April	  7,	  1952	  a	  report	  to	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  by	  The	  Executive	  Secretary	  on	  United	  States	  Objectives	  and	  Policies	  with	  Respect	  to	  the	  Arab	  States	  and	  Israel	  was	  released	  and	  gave	  policy	  recommendations	  to	  the	  President	  on	  the	  Middle	  East.158	  	  	  American	  policy	  was	  focused	  around	  policy	  guidelines:	  	   to	  prevent	  instability	  within	  these	  countries	  which	  threatens	  Western	  Interest.	  	  To	  prevent	  the	  extension	  of	  Soviet	  Influence	  in	  the	  area.	  To	  insure	  that	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  area	  are	  still	  available	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  allies	  for	  use	  in	  strengthening	  the	  free	  world.	  To	  strengthen	  the	  will	  and	  ability	  of	  these	  countries	  to	  resist	  possible	  future	  aggression	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  To	  establish	  within	  the	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community	  of	  nations	  a	  new	  relationship	  with	  the	  states	  of	  the	  area	  that	  recognizes	  their	  desire	  to	  achieve	  status	  and	  respect	  for	  their	  sovereign	  equality.159	  	   	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration	  Israel	  began	  to	  establish	  its	  unequivocal	  preference	  towards	  America.	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  immediately	  accept	  Israel’s	  advance	  towards	  the	  West,	  and	  continued	  to	  withhold	  aid	  and	  focus	  on	  maintaining	  relationships	  with	  Arab	  countries.	  Israel	  was	  forced	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  unfavorable	  foreign	  policies	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  good	  rapport.	  Israel	  was	  not	  viewed	  as	  a	  favorable	  ally	  for	  the	  west	  until	  later	  in	  the	  decade.	  	  Despite	  Israel’s	  support	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  country’s	  deliberate	  move	  away	  from	  its	  association	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  the	  United	  States	  still	  criticized	  Israel	  for	  the	  Arab	  refugee	  crisis	  and	  administered	  weapon	  restrictions	  on	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  United	  States	  under	  President	  Eisenhower	  continued	  to	  stall	  developing	  substantial	  commitments	  between	  America	  and	  Israel.	  President	  Eisenhower	  endorsed	  many	  of	  the	  policies	  recommended	  by	  the	  State	  Department	  as	  Cold	  War	  concerns	  increased.	  In	  contrast	  to	  President	  Truman,	  President	  Eisenhower	  acted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  policy	  recommendations	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  pursued	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  proposals	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	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Chapter	  4:	  Eisenhower	  and	  America’s	  Shift	  Towards	  the	  Liberation	  Policy	  	  	   President	  Eisenhower	  came	  to	  office	  January	  20,	  1953	  and	  immediately	  began	  to	  form	  policies	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  Eisenhower’s	  policies	  consistently	  focused	  on	  advancing	  the	  American	  relations	  with	  Arab	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  The	  presidents	  demonstrated	  his	  pro-­‐Arab	  tendencies	  during	  the	  Middle	  East’s	  pivotal	  event	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  Suez	  Crisis,	  during	  which	  Eisenhower	  demanded	  Israel	  relinquish	  territory	  gained	  in	  favor	  of	  Egypt.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  though	  pro-­‐Western	  sentiment	  diminished	  within	  Arab	  leadership	  and	  Arab	  nations	  sought	  more	  advantageous	  relations	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  As	  Soviet	  influence	  in	  the	  region	  increased,	  the	  United	  States	  established	  deeper	  ties	  to	  democratic	  Israel.	  	  	   Corresponding	  with	  American	  Middle	  East	  policy	  during	  the	  Truman	  administration,	  the	  main	  interest	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  Eisenhower	  was	  to	  uphold	  positive	  relationships	  with	  Arab	  countries	  in	  order	  to	  repel	  Soviet	  influence.	  	  As	  Egyptian	  nationalism	  grew	  and	  Gamal	  Abdel	  Nasser	  rose	  to	  power,	  the	  United	  States	  opposed	  colonialism	  and	  kept	  relations	  with	  Israel	  distant.	  The	  United	  States	  would	  immediately	  recognize	  Nasser	  following	  he	  gained	  control	  of	  Egypt	  on	  July	  23,	  1952.160	  President	  Eisenhower	  closely	  followed	  the	  advice	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  and	  they	  together	  formed	  the	  Liberation	  Policy	  during	  the	  first	  month	  of	  Eisenhower’s	  administration.	  	  	   Secretary	  of	  State	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  would	  essentially	  define	  American	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  during	  Eisenhower’s	  eight-­‐year	  administration.	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Dulles	  considered	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  a	  crucial	  region	  to	  contain	  in	  order	  to	  win	  the	  Cold	  War.161	  	  In	  order	  to	  protect	  American	  national	  security	  Dulles	  created	  multiple	  plans	  with	  hopes	  to	  construct	  an	  alliance	  between	  American	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  against	  Communism.	  For	  Dulles,	  the	  way	  to	  do	  so	  would	  be	  to	  focus	  on	  alignment	  with	  the	  Arab	  states	  over	  developing	  a	  deeper	  relationship	  with	  Israel.	  	  	  	   Dulles	  pushed	  for	  U.S.	  policy	  to	  take	  a	  more	  involved	  role	  against	  communism	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  U.S.	  must	  endeavor	  to	  help	  the	  "liberation	  of	  captive	  peoples"	  living	  under	  communist	  rule.	  Dulles	  strove	  to	  take	  a	  more	  active	  approach	  than	  Truman’s	  containment	  policy.	  He	  hoped	  to	  actively	  reverse	  the	  influence	  of	  communism	  while	  making	  an	  effort	  to	  inhibit	  any	  further	  expansion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Dulles	  states	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  “shall	  never	  have	  a	  secure	  peace	  or	  a	  happy	  world	  so	  long	  as	  Soviet	  communism	  dominates	  one-­‐third	  of	  all	  of	  the	  peoples."162	  	  In	  January,	  following	  Eisenhower’s	  inauguration,	  Congress	  backed	  the	  president’s	  position	  on	  Communism	  and	  using	  the	  Liberation	  Policy	  to	  combat	  Soviet	  threats.163	  	  
	   Following	  the	  sale	  of	  arms	  to	  Israel	  on	  February	  27,	  1952,	  the	  United	  States	  denied	  selling	  any	  further	  arms	  to	  Israel.164	  	  Israel	  sought	  to	  obtain	  arms	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  ignored	  Israel’s	  request	  and	  focused	  on	  selling	  weapons	  to	  Egypt.	  America	  continued	  to	  conduct	  affairs	  strategically	  with	  Israel	  so	  not	  to	  agitate	  Arab	  leaders.	  The	  United	  States	  did	  not	  want	  to	  act	  in	  any	  way	  that	  would	  alter	  and	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impede	  Arab	  relations	  with	  the	  U.S..	  American	  leaders	  believed,	  as	  part	  of	  their	  anti-­‐Communist	  ideology,	  that	  by	  arming	  Nasser	  and	  Egypt	  they	  could	  successfully	  keep	  the	  Arabs	  disaffiliated	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Concurrently,	  some	  American	  leaders	  wanted	  Arab	  nations	  to	  explicitly	  align	  themselves	  with	  the	  United	  States	  by	  agreeing	  to	  arms	  deals	  in	  exchange	  for	  endorsing	  anti-­‐Communist	  ideology.165	  	  
	   John	  Foster	  Dulles	  went	  on	  a	  fact	  finding	  mission	  to	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  May	  11,	  1953	  in	  order	  to	  broker	  agreements	  and	  retain	  tied	  with	  mainly	  Egypt,	  but	  also	  Israel.166	  In	  July	  of	  that	  year	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  published	  a	  memorandum	  outlining,	  “United	  States	  Objectives	  and	  Policies	  with	  Respect	  to	  the	  Near	  East.	  In	  the	  document	  t	  it	  was	  proposed	  to	  “progressively	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  economic	  aid	  furnished	  to	  Israel,	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  It	  in	  to	  impartial	  relationship	  to	  aid	  to	  others	  in	  the	  area.”167	  America	  viewed	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  an	  area,	  “of	  great	  strategic,	  political	  and	  economic	  importance	  to	  the	  free	  world.	  The	  area	  contains	  the	  greatest	  petroleum	  resources	  in	  the	  world;	  essential	  locations	  for	  strategic	  military	  bases	  in	  any	  world	  conflict	  against	  communism;	  the	  Suez	  Canal;	  and	  natural	  defensive	  barriers.”168	  	  Following	  Dulles’	  opinion	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  believed	  that,	  “Inclusion	  of	  Israel”	  in	  American	  arms	  relations,	  “at	  this	  time	  would	  result	  in	  Arab	  refusal	  to	  cooperate.	  “169	  The	  plan	  for	  Israel	  was	  to,	  “progressively	  reducing	  the	  amount	  of	  economic	  aid	  furnished	  to	  Israel,	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  it	  into	  impartial	  relationship	  to	  aid	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others	  in	  the	  area.”170	  	  For	  the	  Arabs,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  plan	  was	  to,	  “continue	  economic	  and	  technical	  aid…facilitating	  the	  resettlement	  of	  Arab	  refugees.”171	  	   “From	  the	  mid	  1950’s	  onward,	  the	  rise	  of	  pan-­‐Arabism	  and	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  Egypts’	  Gamal	  ‘Abd	  al-­‐Nasser	  posed	  particular	  dilemmas	  for	  American	  policy	  makers,”172	  who	  needed	  to	  retain	  Egypt	  as	  a	  ally	  while	  Egypt	  was	  gaining	  its	  own	  power.	  With	  more	  power	  Egypt	  was	  able	  to	  leverage	  more	  deals	  from	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  understood	  that	  diplomatic	  ties	  with	  Egypt	  would	  provide	  an	  outlet	  to	  influence	  the	  whole	  Arab	  Middle	  East	  connected	  to	  the	  Pan-­‐Arab	  movement.	  	   While	  Israel	  hoped	  to	  gain	  a	  loan	  guarantee	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  Dulles	  ultimately	  went	  against	  any	  plans.	  Israeli	  Ambassador	  Abba	  Eban	  opened	  the	  conversation	  by	  writing	  to	  the	  State	  Department	  on	  May	  10,	  1955	  and	  stating	  that	  he	  felt	  that	  good	  progress	  was	  being	  made	  in	  developing	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Israel.	  The	  Ambassador	  referred	  to	  the	  letter	  of	  May	  4,	  sent	  by	  Prime	  Minister	  Sharett	  to	  the	  Secretary	  Dulles	  commenting,	  “The	  letter	  could	  be	  summarized	  briefly	  in	  that	  Israel	  wished	  a	  formal	  security	  association	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  also	  was	  willing	  to	  cooperate	  in	  measures	  to	  relieve	  tensions	  in	  the	  area.”173	  	  While	  Moshe	  Sharett	  made	  forming	  an	  arms	  deal	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel,	  Dulles	  introduced	  the	  Alpha	  Plan.	  Both	  Dulles’	  Alpha	  Plan	  to	  fins	  a	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resolution	  for	  peace	  by	  settling	  issues	  such	  as	  refugees,	  	  Arab	  territories,	  and	  Jerusalem	  and	  Sharrett’s	  push	  for	  an	  American	  arms	  deal	  failed.174	  	   Late	  1954	  and	  early	  1955	  had	  enormous	  implications	  for	  Soviet	  foreign	  policy	  on	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  Nikita	  Kruschev	  led	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Kruschev	  intensified	  the	  Soviet	  Union’s	  Cold	  War	  rivalry	  with	  the	  United	  States	  and	  increased	  diplomatic	  permeation	  and	  relationship	  building	  in	  the	  Arab	  world.175	  Dulles	  responded	  by	  keeping	  relations	  with	  Israel	  cold.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  Israeli	  Prime	  Minster	  Moshe	  Sharett	  on	  April	  16,	  1955	  Dulles	  stated	  that	  “No	  formal	  treaty	  guarantee	  of	  Israel	  or	  her	  neighbors	  would	  meet	  with	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Senate	  or	  the	  American	  people	  unless	  there	  was	  a	  reasonable	  chance	  of	  stability	  in	  the	  area.”176	  	  	   Even	  when	  Nasser	  formed	  an	  arms	  deal	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  during	  September	  1955	  the	  United	  States	  maintained	  a	  good	  rapport	  with	  Egypt.177	  	  In	  1955	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  formed	  the	  Czech	  arms	  deal,	  thus	  supplying	  Egypt	  with	  more	  that	  $250	  Million	  worth	  of	  Soviet	  weapons.	  Egypt	  turned	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  after	  Eisenhower	  failed	  to	  receive	  approval	  from	  Congress	  to	  sell	  weapons	  to	  Egypt.	  Eisenhower,	  despite	  fearing	  a	  Middle	  Eastern	  arms	  race,	  continued	  plans	  to	  help	  fund	  Nasser’s	  plans	  for	  the	  Aswan	  High	  Dam,	  a	  long	  time	  ambition	  and	  engineering	  feat	  for	  the	  Egyptian	  people.	  Eisenhower	  hoped	  that	  by	  committing	  U.S.	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funds	  to	  aid	  Egypt	  in	  building	  the	  High	  Dam	  Nasser	  would	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  weapons	  Egypt	  purchased	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  	  	   The	  Operations	  Coordinating	  Board	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  President	  met	  in	  Washington,	  D.C.	  on	  October	  11,	  1955	  and	  published	  a,	  “Memorandum	  for	  the	  Board	  Assistants	  From	  QCB	  Secretariat	  Staff.”	  It	  detailed	  the	  development	  of	  affairs	  in	  the	  Middle	  east	  and	  outlined	  future	  U.S.	  plans.	  The	  United	  States	  would,	  “assist	  in	  counteracting	  the	  Soviet	  cultural	  offensive	  in	  Egypt,	  funds	  have	  been	  allotted	  for	  a	  bi-­‐national	  cultural	  center	  in	  Cairo	  and	  negotiation	  of	  an	  agreement	  with	  the	  Egyptian	  Government	  for	  the	  Center’s	  establishment	  in	  progress.”178	  	  	   After	  Israel’s	  appeals	  to	  the	  United	  States	  received	  little	  reciprocity	  the	  country	  turned	  to	  the	  second	  most	  powerful	  western	  nations.	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France.	  On	  October	  29,	  1956,	  Israel	  along	  with	  France	  and	  Great	  Britain	  launched	  a	  joint	  attack	  and	  successfully	  invaded	  Egypt.	  Israel	  attacked	  Egypt	  through	  the	  Sinai	  Peninsula	  while	  Great	  Britain	  and	  France	  bombed	  Egyptian	  air	  bases.	  Britian	  and	  France	  landed	  paratroopers	  at	  Port	  Said	  and	  together	  with	  Israel	  occupied	  the	  northern	  half	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal.	  	  	   The	  Suez	  Crisis	  generated	  U.S.	  criticism	  of	  Israel	  and	  a	  demand	  from	  President	  Eisenhower	  to	  remove	  all	  Israeli	  forces	  from	  Egypt	  without	  question.	  The	  United	  States,	  through	  the	  U.N.	  forced	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  not	  only	  Israeli	  forces,	  but	  also	  French	  and	  British.	  The	  United	  States,	  in	  its	  constant	  effort	  to	  abate	  the	  Arab	  nations,	  chose	  to	  alienate	  France,	  Britain,	  and	  Israel	  and	  support	  the	  Arabs	  fight	  against	  colonial	  powers	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  	  Israel,	  wanting	  to	  build	  U.S.-­‐Israel	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Message	  to	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  January	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  (Washington,	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relations,	  ceded	  to	  the	  United	  States	  demands	  even	  after	  Eisenhower’s	  public	  criticism.179	  	  Although	  the	  United	  States	  expended	  great	  efforts	  to	  improve	  relationships	  with	  Arab	  countries,	  America’s	  commitments	  ended	  up	  ineffective	  as	  the	  Arabs	  fell	  under	  the	  Soviet	  sphere	  of	  influence.	  	  In	  May	  of	  1956	  America	  detached	  itself	  from	  Egypt	  by	  canceling	  U.S.	  funding	  for	  the	  High	  Dam	  in	  response	  to	  Egypt’s	  recognition	  of	  Communist	  China.180	  	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dulles,	  despite	  Egypt’s	  move	  towards	  the	  Soviets,	  gave	  Egypt	  $30	  million	  worth	  of	  economic	  assistance	  in	  1956.181	  	  In	  the	  fight	  against	  Soviet	  Influence	  the	  Arab	  states	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  more	  advantageous	  ally	  than	  Israel.	  In	  Dulles’	  opinion,	  Israel’s	  size	  and	  strength	  did	  not	  compare	  to	  the	  Arab	  states	  making	  them	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  keep	  Soviet	  influence	  at	  bay.	  	  Israel’s	  population	  of	  1.7	  million	  could	  not	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  32	  million	  Arabs	  that	  surrounded	  it.182	  It	  was	  imperative,	  according	  to	  Dulles,	  to	  keep	  the	  32	  million	  Arabs	  from	  not	  making	  deals	  with	  the	  Soviet	  block.183	  According	  to	  Dulles,	  “the	  preservation	  of	  the	  state	  of	  Israel,”	  was	  what	  he	  regarded,	  “as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  goals	  of	  the	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.”184	  Nonetheless	  he	  stated,	  “it	  is	  not	  [America’s]	  only	  goal.	  And	  [America	  has]	  to	  combine	  the	  search	  for	  that	  result	  with	  the	  achievement	  of	  other	  results,”	  like	  arms	  deals	  with	  Arab	  nations,	  “which	  are	  also	  important.”185	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  (New	  York:	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  2009b)42.	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  Ibid.,	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  127.	  183	  Ibid.,	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The	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine	  of	  January	  1957	  aimed	  at	  continuing	  to	  contain	  Soviet	  Influence.	  It	  offered	  $120	  million	  in	  economic	  and	  military	  assistance	  to	  all	  states	  that	  pledged	  to	  help	  thwart	  Soviet	  threats.186	  The	  United	  States	  established	  the	  policy	  of	  assisting	  any	  nation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  that	  endorsed	  its	  own	  independence	  and	  separation	  from	  the	  Soviets.187	  Israel	  did	  not	  receive	  many	  immediate	  benefits	  from	  the	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine,	  even	  with	  the	  country’s	  need	  for	  funding	  to	  help	  Israel’s	  influx	  of	  immigrants.	  The	  United	  Nations	  placement	  in	  the	  Gulf	  of	  Aqaba	  did	  benefit	  Israel.	  	  	   Through	  out	  the	  decade	  American	  aid	  to	  Israel	  was	  continuously	  reduced	  leading	  to	  an	  American	  grant	  aid	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  $7.5	  million	  in	  1958.	  The	  following	  year	  U.S.	  aid	  to	  Israel	  was	  reduced	  to	  nothing.	  The	  Liberation	  Policy	  defined	  American	  involvement	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  during	  the	  Eisenhower	  Administration.	  Under	  Truman,	  the	  policy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  was	  to	  “contain”	  communism	  within	  its	  boundaries,	  preventing	  it	  from	  spreading	  elsewhere	  insofar	  as	  it	  was	  possible.	  Liberation	  went	  a	  step	  further,	  seeking	  to	  actually	  roll	  back	  communism,	  but	  failed	  following	  the	  strengthening	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  Egypt.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  Israel	  completely	  identified	  itself	  as	  a	  Western	  ally	  and	  opened	  up	  airspace	  to	  British	  and	  U.S.	  paratroopers	  during	  the	  1958	  Middle	  East	  Crisis	  in	  order	  to	  aid	  King	  Hussein	  of	  Jordan.	  While	  Eisenhower	  and	  building	  a	  relationship	  with	  Arab	  nations	  during	  his	  presidency,	  by	  the	  1960’s	  the	  Arabs,	  led	  by	  Egypt	  and	  Nasser,	  chose	  to	  identify	  and	  cooperate	  with	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  Israel	  then	  emerged	  as	  an	  ally	  of	  the	  West	  leading	  to	  the	  “special	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relationship”	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  that	  would	  develop	  in	  the	  1960’s	  and	  define	  America’s	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  twenty	  first	  century.	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Conclusion:	  Kennedy’s	  Arms	  Sale	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  the	  “Special	  
Relationship”	  	  	   Under	  President	  John	  F.	  Kennedy	  the	  United	  States	  coordinated	  its	  first	  major	  arms	  deal	  with	  Israel.	  Kennedy’s	  decision	  to	  sell	  arms	  to	  Israel	  signified	  the	  beginning	  of	  military	  cooperation	  and	  collaboration	  between	  Israel	  and	  United	  States.	  Israel’s	  relationship	  greatly	  improved	  following	  the	  sale	  of	  Hawk	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles	  to	  Israel.188	  While	  the	  U.S.	  continued	  to	  criticize	  Israel	  for	  its	  nuclear	  developments,	  it	  was	  evident	  that	  the	  United	  States	  extended	  preference	  towards	  Israel	  over	  the	  Arab	  nations.	  	  	   The	  sale	  of	  Hawk	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles	  followed	  the	  Soviet	  Unions	  sale	  of	  long-­‐range	  bombers	  to	  Egypt.	  Prior	  to	  obtaining	  the	  Presidency	  Kennedy	  demonstrated	  pro-­‐Israel	  sentiment.	  When	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  made	  the	  Czech	  Arms	  Deal	  with	  Egypt	  Kennedy	  favored	  supplying	  Israel	  with	  arms	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  arms	  balance	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  While	  Kennedy	  also	  supported	  supplying	  Arab	  nations	  with	  weapons	  he	  criticized	  both	  the	  Tripartite	  Agreement	  and	  the	  Eisenhower	  Doctrine.189	  Kennedy	  did	  not	  see	  the	  benefit	  of	  having	  the	  Arab	  states	  as	  the	  major	  Cold	  War	  ally	  to	  the	  West	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  as	  Eisenhower	  and	  Dulles	  did.	  Kennedy’s	  arms	  deal	  with	  Israel	  in	  1962	  marked	  the	  first	  large	  scale	  arms	  sale	  to	  Israel.	  The	  sale	  of	  Hawk	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles	  gave	  Israel	  its	  first	  qualitative	  advantage	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  As	  Israeli	  and	  American	  policy	  became	  more	  congruous	  during	  the	  1950’s	  the	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United	  States	  attitude	  towards	  Israel	  shifted.	  The	  sources	  of	  the	  “special”	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship	  did	  not	  form	  from	  Domestic	  pressures	  from	  the	  American	  Jewish	  community,	  but	  emerged	  following	  the	  Arab	  states	  departure	  from	  their	  association	  with	  the	  Western	  bloc.	  While	  originally,	  a	  relationship	  with	  the	  new	  State	  of	  Israel	  was	  seen	  in	  some	  cases	  to	  hinder	  U.S.	  security	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  Jewish	  states	  existence,	  America	  developed	  a	  close	  relationship	  with	  Israel	  up	  to	  the	  present.	  During	  the	  Cold	  War,	  Israel	  aided	  the	  United	  Stated	  in	  containing	  Soviet	  infiltration	  of	  the	  Middle	  East.	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Abstract	  Today	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  includes	  multiple	  bi-­‐lateral	  initiatives	  in	  the	  military,	  industrial,	  and	  private	  sectors.	  Israel	  is	  Americas	  most	  established	  ally	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  to	  possess	  a	  “special	  relationship”	  highly	  valued	  by	  the	  United	  States.	  Although	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  drive	  both	  American	  and	  Israeli	  foreign	  policy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  today,	  following	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  the	  United	  States	  originally	  did	  not	  advance	  major	  aid	  and	  benefits	  to	  the	  new	  state.	  While	  current	  foreign	  policy	  focuses	  on	  preserving	  the	  strong	  relationship	  with	  the	  only	  democratic	  nation	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Israel,	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  the	  United	  States	  global	  foreign	  policy	  focused	  on	  combating	  Soviet	  Influence	  and	  containing	  the	  spread	  of	  communism.	  The	  early	  relationship	  between	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Israel	  was	  contrived	  around	  United	  States	  Cold	  War	  strategies	  that	  dominated	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  for	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  the	  20th	  Century.	  All	  the	  presidents	  ranging	  from	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  to	  Harry	  Truman	  all	  supported	  the	  proposition	  of	  a	  Jewish	  national	  home	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  not	  engineered	  by	  domestic	  lobbies	  or	  the	  American	  Jewish	  population,	  but	  emerged	  as	  a	  strategic	  relationship	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  American	  support	  for	  Israel	  was	  originally	  predicated	  upon	  early	  commitments	  the	  United	  States	  upheld	  including	  the	  Balfour	  Declaration	  of	  1917	  and	  United	  Nations	  Resolution	  181	  (1947)	  which	  both	  dictated	  a	  form	  of	  a	  Jewish	  home	  in	  the	  area	  known	  as	  Palestine.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  an	  image	  of	  American	  credibility,	  and	  out	  maneuver	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  United	  States	  became	  the	  first	  nation	  to	  extend	  de	  facto	  recognition	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Israel	  on	  May	  14,	  1949.	  The	  United	  States	  policy	  during	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  Israel’s	  existence	  was	  reflexive	  of	  greater	  global	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  focused	  on	  combating	  Communist	  expansion.	  In	  its	  early	  years,	  Israel	  originally	  adopted	  a	  policy	  of	  non-­‐alignment	  with	  both	  the	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  Powers	  in	  order	  for	  the	  state	  to	  receive	  opportunities	  available	  from	  both	  blocks.	  The	  United	  States	  took	  a	  hesitant	  approach	  towards	  Israel	  and	  focused	  on	  building	  relationships	  with	  the	  Arab	  states	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.	  American	  Cold	  War	  policy	  dictated	  American	  policy	  towards	  Israel.	  The	  origins	  of	  the	  American	  affiliation	  with	  Israel	  derive	  from	  Israel’s	  commitment	  to	  anti-­‐communism	  following	  Arab	  alignment	  and	  arms	  cooperation	  with	  the	  Soviet	  block	  in	  the	  1950’s.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  a	  balance	  of	  Western	  and	  Soviet	  power	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  the	  United	  States	  shifted	  its	  attitude	  towards	  Israel	  and	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  the	  two	  countries	  relationship.	  The	  sale	  of	  Hawk	  anti-­‐aircraft	  missiles	  marked	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  U.S.-­‐Israel	  relationship	  and	  led	  to	  the	  bi-­‐national	  military	  collaborations	  the	  two	  countries	  are	  known	  for	  today.	  
